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Abstract
This thesis develops a dynamic industry equilibrium framework to be employed 
in situations where firms compete in a complex environment with either several 
firms in the industry or large state spaces. This model is employed to analyze 
the problems of Investment, R&D and Credit Constraints in situations where the 
’curse of dimensionality’ occurs. Chapter 1 introduces the problem and applica­
tions. Chapter 2 describes the model, assumptions and main results. Chapter 
3 considers the problem of estimating production functions in a manner which 
is consistent with the model. Chapter 4 contains an application to estimate the 
Sunk Costs of R&D in the Portuguese Moulds Industry and estimate them to be 
about 2.6 million euros (1.7 times the average firm sales level). Finally Chapter 
5 incorporates an application to the US Steel Industry to estimate the costs of 
external finance. We find that the average sunk cost of R&D for this industry is 
on the order of $194m and the costs of external finance are about 35 cents per 
dollar raised.
In the second application (in joint work with John Van Reenen), we use a simi­
lar framework and introduce financial constraints which can affect investment and 
R&D decisions. By specifying a dynamic structural model and solving through 
numerical simulation we model adjustment costs, R&D decisions and financial 
constraints simultaneously. Applying the model to 35 years of firm-level panel 
data from the US iron and steel industry we provide evidence that costs of ex­
ternal finance are substantial, consistent with asymmetric information, even in a 
developed financial market like the US. The average sunk cost of R&D is on the 
order of $194m - consistent with industry estimates of the typical costs of building 
an R&D lab.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this thesis I try to address two fundamental questions in economics. The 
first is the existence of sunk costs of R&D which, as emphasized by other authors, 
can significantly affect equilibrium market structure and innovation. The second 
question is the role of financial constraints for investment in general and innova­
tion in particular. This question is one of the most debated issues in empirical 
economics. It is obviously important as investment and innovation are critical for 
economic growth, so financial market failures can have first order effects on wel­
fare, and policies to address growth will depend on whether financial constraints 
are important.
To study these problems I develop a tractable model with dynamic competition 
where firms can decide to invest in physical capital and R&D. By assuming that 
firms’ individual states are private information, the industry state is summarized 
by the aggregate (payoff relevant) state. This has two advantages for estimation 
purposes: (i) it avoids the ’curse of dimensionality’, typical in dynamic industry 
models and; (ii) it deals with unobserved firms in the data, a problem neglected 
in the literature arising if one wants to estimate from the equilibrium conditions 
which depend on the whole (unobserved) industry state.
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As a by-product, I address two problems in the production function estimation 
literature. The first problem is input endogeneity and the second is the use of 
deflated sales as a proxy for output when there is imperfect competition. Using 
a demand system and allowing input demand to depend on the individual state 
variables as well as on the industry equilibrium I explain how to jointly recover 
the production function parameters and demand elasticity.
In the first application I recover the sunk costs of R&D for the Portuguese 
Moulds Industry and estimate them to be about 2.6 million euros (1.7 times the 
average firm sales level). I also evaluate the impact of a reduction in the sunk 
costs of R&D on equilibrium market structure, productivity and capital stock. 
The results corroborate the idea that sunk costs of R&D have implications for 
policies which target at promoting R&D. Policy makers should be concerned with 
reducing the large sunk costs of R&D and promote R&D start-ups.
In the second application (in joint work with John Van Reenen), we use a simi­
lar framework and introduce financial constraints which can affect investment and 
R&D decisions. By specifying a dynamic structural model and solving through 
numerical simulation we model adjustment costs, R&D decisions and financial 
constraints simultaneously. Applying the model to 35 years of firm-level panel 
data from the US iron and steel industry we provide evidence that costs of ex­
ternal finance are substantial, consistent with asymmetric information, even in a 
developed financial market like the US. The average sunk cost of R&D is on the 
order of $194m - consistent with industry estimates of the typical costs of building 
an R&D lab.
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Chapter 2 
Investm ent and R&D in a 
Dynam ic Equilibrium w ith  
Incom plete Information
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter I develop a model which can be applied to the type of financial 
firm level datasets normally available and avoids the ’curse of dimensionality’. 
The framework is the following: firms can enter and exit the market, invest in 
physical capital and decide to engage in R&D by paying a setup sunk cost. There 
are both linear and quadratic costs with total irreversibility for physical capital 
investment. Productivity follows a first order Markov process which depends on 
whether the firm is an R&D performer or not. Finally, firms compete in the market 
where demand is modeled by a representative consumer Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution framework.
Most firm level datasets1 contain information on financial variables (balance
1 Examples of these are Standard & Poor’s COMPUSTAT for US firms, Bureau Van Dijk’s 
FAME (UK) and AMADEUS (Europe) or Thomson Financial’s DATASTREAM (UK). Only
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sheet, profits and losses, number of workers) for a subset of the total population of 
firms in the industry. However, estimating a game theoretic type of model where 
players’ strategies depend on the state of all competitors, requires observing all 
players in the industry.2 This becomes a problem because the equilibrium resulting 
from such a game depends on the state of all individual competitors. If some of 
these competitors axe unobserved in the data, in principle, it becomes hard to 
estimate such an equilibrium model. To see this imagine that we want to estimate 
a policy function as a function of the state of all (N ) competitors in the industry, 
cr(si, ...sn ). If there is data on actions and individual states, this can be done 
non-parametrically. However, if some players are not observed we immediately 
face a problem of unobserved heterogeneity since some important variables are 
unobserved. So, either we control for this unobserved heterogeneity in some way 
or we face problems in estimating the equilibrium policy functions.
A second problem is the ’curse of dimensionality’ which occurs when the state 
space grows exponentially, either by increasing the number of firms or the num­
ber of states per firm. This is in fact the main constraint on solving dynamic 
industry equilibrium models and other authors have tried to address (for example 
Weintraub, Benkard and Van Roy, 2007).
Most studies in empirical Industrial Organization have then focused in oligopolies 
or regulated industries where good information for a small number of players in 
the market is available. This leaves aside a large number of industries which are 
interesting cases to study. In this paper I propose a framework which allows us 
to estimate a structural model without facing these problems. Furthermore, for 
questions like the sunk costs of R&D, oligopolistic markets might be less interest­
census data would contain observations for all firms present in the industry and even in this case 
smaller firms are normally sampled.
2This can be relaxed if only the distribution of states is relevant, (for example, by imposing 
symmetry and anonymity). In this case the industry state distribution is a sufficient statistic 
for the industry state. In principle, if we know the sampling method for collecting the data, we 
can potentially recover the industry distribution from the observed sample.
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ing because in some of these industries firms are sufficiently large and the sunk 
cost of R&D are not binding. However, if firms are sufficiently large and sunk 
costs of R&D do not bind, the data would not show sufficient variation in R&D 
performance to allow identification of sunk costs because either all firms or no firm 
would do R&D.
To deal with the problems mentioned above, I introduce the assumption of 
incomplete information. By doing so the industry state, under some assumptions, 
can be summarized by the (payoff relevant) aggregate state. The equilibrium 
definition is then very intuitive. Agents behave optimally conditional on their 
beliefs about the evolution for the aggregate industry state. The beliefs about the 
evolution of the aggregate industry state are equilibrium beliefs, meaning that they 
are rational beliefs. The assumption addresses the two problems both avoiding 
the ’curse of dimensionality’ by reducing the dimensionality of the state space and 
dealing with unobserved firms in the data since it only requires that the aggregate 
industry state is observed.3
I have also developed an algorithm to solve the model which resembles a nested 
fixed point where the inside loop solves the dynamic programing problem and the 
outside loop solves for equilibrium beliefs (Figure 2.1). I can use this algorithm to 
recalculate the model for different structural parameters and perform policy sim­
ulations. Due to the ’curse of dimensionality, this would not be computationally
3 To better understand the ” curse of dimensionality’ problem, consider a model with several 
state variables per firm and/or large numbers of firms. Equilibria and policy rules are then 
computationally intractable since the size of the problem grows exponentially. For example, let 
s be the industry state (i.e. define Su the state vector of firm i at time t, then the industry state 
at time t  is st =  (sit, . . . s a t *) ) ,  finding the industry state transition, g(st+i|s t), for an industry 
with 50 firms and 2 binary state variables would mean calculating a 450 x 450 transition matrix. 
If one introduces the typical anonymity and symmetry assumptions (Pakes and McGuire, 2001) 
the problem will be greatly reduced but still intractable (502 x 502). The ’curse of dimensionality’ 
is not only a computational problem but will also arise in the estimation. As we will see ahead, 
since this industry state is very large, if one tries to estimate a flexible policy function on the 
whole state like proposed by Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007), it will require a large amount of 
data (not available on most firm level dataset). The best one can do then is estimate the policies 
for some aggregation of the state space like implemented in Ryan (2006).
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possible in the Full Information case for industries where the average number of 
firms reaches hundreds.
No
Yes
@+1 (St+1|St)-qi (St+1|St)|<e
tt(.)  
q° (st+1|st)
STOP 
Output: q(.), V(.), a(.)
Solve contraction V(sjt,St) 
Get policies o (sit,St)
Simulate industry and recover 
________ 0* (StJ S t)__________
Notes: Algorithm is initialized at iteration 0. t t (.) are period returns. qi+1 
(St+1|St) is aggregate state transition at iteration j+1. V(su,St) is the Value 
function and o(S|(1S,) are the policy functions. The final output of the 
algorithm are the optimal value and policy function a s  well a s  the 
equilibrium industry state transition.
Figure 2.1: Algorithm for solving the model
In related research Weintraub, Benkard and Van Roy (2007) propose the use 
of a different equilibrium concept, the "Oblivious Equilibrium". In this type of 
equilibrium firms disregard the current state of the industry and base their deci­
sions solely upon the (stationary) long run industry state. As the number of firms 
in the industry grows, they show that it converges to the Markov Perfect Nash 
Equilibrium (MPNE) provided the industry state distribution satisfies a Tight 
tail’ condition. This result resembles Hopenhayn (1992) where, with no aggregate 
shocks, the equilibrium is deterministic when the number of firms grows large.
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Introducing incomplete information has some potential drawbacks by implic­
itly imposing more structure on the type of strategic interactions since firms now 
react to the ’average’ competitor (i.e. firm A’s reaction to a market structure 
where both competitors B and C are very similar will be the same as when B is 
very large and C is very small). How well this approximates actual competition 
in the industry will vary from case to case. It is more likely that the assumption 
is not valid in oligopolistic industries where strategic interactions are very impor­
tant. In other industries, competition might be well summarized by the aggregate 
variables. Some examples of this can be industries where there is a large number 
of players, no market leaders or products axe differentiated, like Industrial Ma­
chinery Manufacturing or Metalworking Machinery Manufacturing (moulds, dies, 
machine tools). What these industries share in common is the fact that each 
firm sells specialized products, prices are contract specific and information is not 
publicly available.
The earlier dynamic models only accounted for the effects of entry and exit 
and did not allowed for investment or R&D (Jovanovic, 1982; Hopenhayn, 1992). 
Ericson and Pakes (1995) develop an attractive framework for modeling investment 
decisions where players use Markovian Strategies which result in a Markov Perfect 
Nash Equilibrium (MPNE) as defined by Maskin and Tirole (1988, 2001).
However, solving the MPNE brings with it two complications. One was the 
possibility of non-existence of equilibrium in pure strategies which Doraszelski and 
Satterthwaite (2007) addressed with the introduction of privately observed inde­
pendent and identically distributed shocks. These shocks "smooth out" reaction 
functions reestablishing existence of equilibria. The second, is the ’curse of dimen­
sionality’ and the computational burden attached to solving the model. Recent 
algorithms (e.g. Pakes and McGuire (2001)) are successful in minimizing this sec­
ond problem and can solve the model for up to 10-15 firms, by using stochastic
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algorithms similar to the artificial intelligence literature. However, they cannot 
solve problems where there is either a larger number of firms in the market or 
large state spaces per firm.
Other theoretical models exist that study the R&D decision in an industry 
framework. Vives (2004) for example, does this in a static setting, but since it does 
not incorporate any heterogeneity, it cannot explain some facts like the coexistence 
of R&D and non-R&D firms. Klette and Kortum (2004) use a dynamic framework 
with the advantage of providing an analytical solution. However, the simplification 
that allows the elegance of an analytical solution is also the constraint which 
prevents extensions to the model (for example accounting for R&D sunk costs and 
aggregate uncertainty).
The literature on dynamic industry models has received increased attention 
recently with the development of several alternative estimators (Aguirregabiria 
and Mira, 2007; Bajari, Benkard and Levin, 2007; Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry, 
forthcoming; Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler, forthcoming) and some success­
ful applications to oligopolistic industries (Benkard, 2004; Ryan, 2005; Schmidt- 
Dengler, 2007).
2.2 T he aggregate sta te  dynam ic m odel
2.2.1 States find actions
This section describes the elements of the general model. Time is discrete and 
every period, t =  1 ,2 ,..., oo, there are N  firms in the market (Nt incumbents and 
N£ =  N  — Nt potential entrants) where a firm is denoted by i G { 1 , N }
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States Agents are endowed with a continuous state Su £ Sj4 and a vector of 
payoff shocks <pit £ 3 both belonging to some compact set. Both the state and 
the payoff are privately observed by the players. The econometrician observes the 
states, su, but not the payoff shocks, ipit.
The industry state is st — (sit, ..., sjvt) £ s f .  The vector of payoff shocks 
are independent and identically distributed and can depend on the actions of the 
players. This satisfies Rust’s (1987) conditional independence assumption5 and 
allows the value function to be written as a function of the state variables which 
keeps the number of payoff relevant state variables small.
Assum ption 2.1 (a) Individual states and actions are private information and; 
(b)g(st \St , . . . ,S 0) =  9 (st \St)
where g(st \St) is the density function for the industry state, st, conditional on 
the aggregate state St.
Assumption 2.1 states that the only common information to all players is the 
aggregate state. Moreover, it implies that everything agents can learn about the 
state of the industry, st , is contained in St and history (St~ i , ..., 5o) adds no more 
extra information.
A ctions Incumbents choose I =  lc +  ld actions that can be continuous a^ t £  
2lc C R*c or discrete (exit, R&D start-up) aft £ {0, l } /d and an =  {a?t , aft} £ 21 C 
RfC x {0, l } ld. Throughout the analysis I will restrict discrete actions to be binary 
for simplicity and I also use one continuous variable (investment) and one discrete 
variable (entry/exit). For example, if aft represents ’status’ and firms choose to
4 The model can be extended to discrete states but I focus here in the continuous case to keep 
notation simple and possible to follow.
5Rust (1987) states the conditional independence assumption
p(st+i,£t+i\st ,Ct,a) =  <7(£t+i|st+i)p(st+i|sf, a) which allows the use of the ex-ante value func­
tion by integrating over et , reducing the dimensionality of the problem.
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exit the industry they set aft =  0. Potential (short lived) entrants may choose to 
pay a privately observed entry cost and enter the industry.
S ta te  transition
A ssum ption  2.2 (No Spillover) Conditional on current state and actions, own 
state evolves with transition function
P(Sit+l\Siti &it)
Per period  payoff Time is discrete and firms receive per period returns 
which depend on the state of the industry, current actions and shocks (ir(an, st , ipit)) 
where the period returns are continuous and bounded.
A ssum ption  2.3 (a) There exists a function (S : s N —> 6  € Rj which maps the 
vector of firm’s individual states (st)  into an aggregate index (S(su, S2t, •••, s^t))  
and the aggregate state is observed with noise (St =  S (sit , S2t , •••, Sjvt) +  £t, where 
et is independent and identically distributed over time with cumulative function Fe 
and bounded support).
(b) Per period returns can be written as
Sf, (f in)  — 7r((2if, S n ,  S t ,  P i t )
Under this assumption, St is the payoff relevant variable commonly observed by 
all agents. The random shock, et , guarantees that there is no perfectly informative 
state St from which agents could recover (sit, exactly.6 Note that the
6 The intuition for this error term is the following, imagine sa is marginal cost which affects 
pricing in the stage game so that the price is a function of the state p(sit ,S t ). If players make 
pricing mistakes, imagine the actual price they set is p(su,St) +  £\, where e\ is independent 
and identically distributed over time and firms, the aggregate state (in this example the average 
N  N  N
price) is then St =  ±  J ~^p{sit , St ) +  e\ =  j j  ^ P i t  +  £t, where et =  -fr .
i=l i=l i=l
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payoff relevant shocks (pit) have no impact on the stage game pricing. One type 
of demand which meets this assumption is the CES demand where the aggregate 
industry state is aggregate industry deflated sales.
The timing is the following:
1. States (su) and shocks (pit) are observed by firms
2. Firms compete in the market and collect period returns (7r(.))
3. Actions (at =  (ait, ..,a;vt) are taken simultaneously
4. New state is formed ((st+i, St+i,(pt+i) £ s N x © x ZN))
2.2.2 Strategies
For each state firms can take actions in some compact set ait G 21. I restrict 
to Symmetric Markovian Pure Strategies,7 which map the set of states into the 
action space, £ 7 : s x 6 x 3 ~ > 2 1  (a it(sit, St , (pit) =  (<^ t (sit, St , <pit), St , p it))) 
where the action space defined by 21 (su, St, <pa) C s x 6 x ^ x  Ric x {0, l } /d can be 
a mixture of closed and compact discrete and continuous sets. Using symmetry 
we can drop the i subscript and imposing stationarity we can drop the t  subscript:
&it{Sit, St, <Pit) — &{Sit, St, Pit)’
Proposition 2.1 Under Assumptions 2.1 to 2.3 the aggregate industry state con­
ditional distribution takes the form q(St+i\St).
Proof. See appendix.
So while the industry state is a vector st =  (sit , S2t> •••> St is a scalar
variable which maps individual firm’s states into an aggregate industry state St =
7Anonymity as defined in Ericson and Pakes (1995) is implicitly imposed by assuming that 
firms do not observe each others state.
23
g(sit , ...S]vt) +  £*• The validity of this result depends on the validity of the as­
sumptions. I propose a method to test the assumptions which I will explain later 
but basically tests whether the transition for the aggregate state is a first-order 
Markov process by testing the significance of previous lags and moments of the 
individual states distribution.
When some actions and states are not observed, the firm has to condition its 
strategies on the expected actions and state of the competitors. When nothing is 
observed about the competitors, the firm will have the same expectation about the 
state and actions for all competitors. To understand the implications of this incom­
plete information assumption, recall that in the Ericson and Pakes framework with 
the symmetry and anonymity assumption firms "keep track” of the industry state 
distribution and not the whole industry state vector as it would be the case with 
no anonymity. This is because under anonymity, the industry state distribution is 
a sufficient statistic for the industry state vector. In the incomplete information 
case I propose, what matters is just one moment of this same distribution so this 
imposes slightly stronger conditions than the usual symmetry and anonymity. It 
implicitly imposes more structure in the type of strategic interactions since firms 
now react to the ’average’ competitor (i.e., ceteris paribus, firm A’s reaction to 
a market structure where both competitors B and C are very similar will be the 
same as when B is very large and C is very small provided the aggregate state 
is the same). Notice that I have assumed implicitly that knowledge about the 
own state is considered to have no impact on the evolution of the aggregate state 
conditional on knowing the current state, i.e., q(St+i\sit , S t) = q(St+i\St).
Corollary 2.1 Under assumptions 2.1 to 2.3 and when St =  ]CiIi H sit) +  £t, as 
N  becomes large q(St+i\St) is approximately normally distributed with conditional 
mean Pst+1\st =  (1 — Ps)lJLs  +  Ps$ and standard deviation <Jst+i\st =  ^ ( l  ~  P2)^ 2- 
Where p Si a<si Ps are respectively the unconditional mean, variance and autocorre­
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lation for the St process.
Proof. By the Central Limit Theorem.
C orollary 2.2 As N  becomes large, three moments of the.aggregate state distri­
bution, (fjLs ,<Js, Ps) fully characterize q(St+i\St).
Proof. Follows directly from Corollary 2.1.
Value function Given Proposition 2.1 and Assumption 2.2, we can write 
the ex-ante value function defined as the discounted sum of future payoffs before 
player specific shocks are observed and actions taken, as
=  / I y, Kit +  P I Wit+ip{dsit+i |Sit, Oj()g(d5t+i 15()
•'V’it it a d L J s i t + l , S t
fXdO'itdipu
where fft =  f (a it\sit, St) is the probability of choosing actions ait =  {acit, aft) 
conditional on being at state (su , St), <l>it =  is the density function for payoff 
shocks (<pit), 7Tit =  7T(ait, sit, St , <pit) are period returns and Wit+\ =  IV(sif+i, St+i) 
is the ex-ante continuation value.
This value function depends on the beliefs about the transition of the ag­
gregate state, q(St+i\St). These beliefs depend on the equilibrium strategies 
played by all players. Notice that since firm i does not observe Sjt ,Vj ^  i, it 
can only form an expectation on its rivals actions conditional on the information 
available St , p{aj t \St) =  f Sj f (a j t \sj t , St)g{sj t \St)dsjt where g{sj t \St) is the prob­
ability density function of firm j ’s state conditional on St and f (a j t \sjt ,S t) =  
f<p. a (sjti St, <Pjt)<f>((pjt)d<Pjt. The assumption has a similar effect to mixed strate­
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gies or privately observed information in Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2007) 
which smooths out the continuation value and guarantees existence of equilibria.8
2.2.3 Equilibrium
The equilibrium concept is Markov Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in the sense 
of Maskin and Tirole (1988, 2001). Since I restrict to Markovian pure strategies 
where the firm can take actions an £ A(sn, St , p it), the problem can be represented 
as:
V{sit, St , (fin] q) =  sup h(s, S, p, a ,V;q)  (2.1)
a£2l(0,5,^ )
where
h(s, S, p ,a ,V \  q)
= {7r(sit, St, Pitt i^t) H- pE{V(sit+1, St+i, i^t+i)|sit> St, an, q}
and
E  [I't.t+ilsjtj St, Pn] =  I Vij+iQidsn+i, dSt+i, dpa+\\sa, St, Pa)
J ses,se&,<pe3
Q(sit+lj <Sf+l> Pit+l\sitt &t, , Pn) — (^*S,t+l|‘S,t)p(5itH-l|Sitj Q‘it)4>(Pit+1)
D efin ition  1 A collection of Markovian strategies and beliefs (a, q()) constitute 
a Markov perfect equilibrium if:
8 Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2005) have shown that in some cases the original Ericson 
and Pakes framework did not have an equilibrium in pure strategies.
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(i) Conditional on beliefs about industry evolution (q) firms’ strategies (aa=  
a*(su, St, ipit]q) maximize the value function V(su, St , q)-
(a) The industry transition (q*(St+i\St; o-*(sit, St , ipu\<l))  resulting from optimal 
behavior (a*t)  defined above is consistent with beliefs q(St+i\St)
The solution to the dynamic programming problem conditional on q is the 
optimal strategy <r*(.|q) and a solution exists, under Blackwell’s regularity condi­
tions. These strategies will then characterize the industry conditional distribution 
q(St+i\St; cr*) and the equilibrium is the fixed point to a mapping from the beliefs 
used to obtain the strategies into this industry state transition
where firm’s follow optimal strategies <?*(.). An equilibrium exists when there 
is a fixed point to the mapping T (q) : 0  —► Q.
T heorem  2.1 An equilibrium q* exists.
Proof. See appendix.
U niqueness
The problem of multiple equilibrium is recurrent in this type of games and has 
been widely discussed in the literature. One of the main concerns is the difficulty 
that arises in estimating the model when one cannot fully characterize the whole 
set of possible equilibria.
"However, discrete games with incomplete information have a very 
different equilibrium structure than games with complete information.
For example, in a static coordination game Bajari, Hong, Krainer and 
Nekipelov (2006) show that the number of equilibria decreases as the
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number of players in the game increase. In fact, the equilibrium is 
typically unique when there are more than four players. In a complete 
information game, by comparison, the average number of Nash equilib­
rium will increase as players are added to the game (see McKelvey and 
McLennan (1996)). Thus, the assumption of incomplete information 
appears to refine the equilibrium se t ." Bajari, Hong and Ryan (2007:
u )
Given the structure of the game developed above, I can compute a subset of 
equilibria. Using Corollary 2.2 the equilibrium is defined by a triple ( p s , a s , Ps)-  
Given this triple I can solve the model for any starting vector (Psia sPs)  ^ d  
compute the resulting equilibrium. Figure 2.2 represents the configuration for 
any starting value of (ps)9 ^ d  corroborates the findings by Bajari et al (2007) 
supporting the idea of uniqueness of equilibrium for this model because there 
is single crossing. Whereas in general uniqueness is difficult to prove, with this 
framework it can be checked by looking at possible equilibrium configurations 
(Psi  Ps)-
2.3 F inal com m ents
Reducing the industry state into the payoff relevant aggregate state by in­
troducing incomplete information avoids the ’curse of dimensionality’. As noted 
before, this imposes more structure on the type of strategic interactions by making 
strategic reactions identical to all competitors. In a sense this condition imposes 
slightly stronger restrictions than the usual anonymity and symmetry assump­
tions which are also fundamental to reduce the dimensionality of the state space. 
Symmetry and anonymity are a restriction that allows the state space to be char-
9(°‘s ,P s ) are held constant only for simplicity in order to provide a visual representation.
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iteration j beliefs keeping variance and  autocorrelation co n s tan t There is ev d en ce  supporting a  sing le  crossing  property and  therefore un iqueness .
Figure 2.2: Uniqueness of equilibria
acterized more compactly as a set of "counting measures" (i.e. the industry state 
distribution).10
In a different area of research, Krusell and Smith (1998) explore a similar idea 
whereby the evolution of the aggregate variables in the economy is well approxi­
mated by some summary statistics even in the presence of substantial heterogene­
ity in the population.
Empirical applications can avoid the calculation of the equilibrium, and its 
computational burden, but they either require estimating Pr(sf+i|s t) from the 
data (Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry, forthcoming) or estimating the policy func­
tions cr(s, ip) (Bajari, Benkard and Levin, 2007). However, if the industry state is 
large, since it does not solve the ’curse of dimensionality’, it will require a very 
large amount of data to flexibly estimate either Pr(st+1|st) or cr(s,tp). Estimating 
very flexible policies can lead to serious bias in the second stage estimates which
10 Notice that the aggregate state is the payoff relevant variable and the role of the individual 
states is only to be informationally relevant.
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arise because the first stage parameters enter nonlinearly in the second stage. 
Therefore any error in the first stage can be greatly magnified into the second 
stage (Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2007). In an empirical application to the Port­
land Cement Industry, Ryan (2005) used the sum of competitors capacities as the 
state variable rather than the individual capacities of competitors. While doing 
this for tractability reasons, it is using a similar approach to what I propose here, 
since players strategies are of the form a (s , 5, <p) instead of cr(s, <p).
Assumptions 2.1 and 2.3 might be seen as restrictive in some settings.11 The 
first is satisfied by most reduced form profit functions whenever S  is payoff rele­
vant. The algorithm is therefore flexible enough to allow different demand struc­
tures provided the aggregate state is the payoff relevant variable.
The second assumption is more restrictive as it imposes that firms do not 
observe each other’s states (and actions) and also that history of the aggregate 
state is irrelevant conditional on the current state. For example, imagine the state 
variable is price, this means that firms observe industry aggregate prices (e.g. 
published by some entity) but they do not observe other firms individual prices 
because this would involve incurring in costly market research. This might not be 
restrictive since in some industries firms try to keep their prices secret.
In industries where there are market leaders, Assumption 2.1 will not hold. 
However, the model can be extended in these cases by enlarging the state space 
to include the state of the market leaders. Instead of one there are two problems 
to solve, one for the leader and one for all other firms and the state space becomes 
(sit, St, su )  where s u  is the state of the leader. Even though this seems logical, 
one would still need to check what the equilibrium resulting from players using 
these strategies looks like, which might not be a trivial extension of the work I
“ Assumption 2.2 (’no spillover’) is standard in the literature and it allows us to write down 
the transition for the individual state conditional on the firms’ actions independently of the other 
firms’ action/states.
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presented here.
Once q(St+i\St) is known the problem can be represented as a standard dy­
namic programming problem which can be estimated with available techniques 
for single agent models (Rust (1987), Hotz and Miller (1993), Aguirregabiria and 
Mira (2002)) or using estimators developed for dynamic games (Aguirregabiria 
and Mira, 2007; Bajari, Benkard and Levin, 2007; Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry, 
forthcoming; Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler, forthcoming).
2.A  A ppendix  
2.A.1 Auxiliary Lemmas
Lem m a 2.1 sit\St is independently and identically distributed across firms with 
density function ^(sjf|5t; q).
Proof. By the independence assumption (no spillovers).
Lem m a 2.2 The distribution g{sit \St) is continuous in sit with positive densities 
and bounded support.
P roof. St =  S(s i t , . . . ,  SNt) +  £« with et independent and identically distributed 
with cumulative function Fe and bounded support. Then St is never perfectly 
informative and therefore g(sit \St) > 0 Vs**, S t.
2.A.2 Proof of Proposition 2.1
Proof. Using Assumptions 2.1 to 2.3, St is the payoff relevant variable and 
g(st \Stj...So) =  g(st\St) the aggregate (industry) state transition is
f(St+i\St, S t- i,  ••••) =  [  f ( s t+1\St , . . . ,S 0)dst+1d<f>(st+1)
J et+i,St+i:S'i+i=S(st+i)+et+i
/  /  p(st+i\st)g(dst \St , ...So)dst+id$(et+i )
J£t+i,st+i:-S't+i=5(st+i)+£t+i •'St
/  /  p(sm |st)£(dst|St)dsm d$(et+i)
£t+i»st+i:5t+i=-5(st+i)+et+i •'St
f  f(st+i\St)d&t+id<&{et+i)
J  e*-Li ,S /-li :SVj-i = S »(s* -h  )+ £ * -h'£t+ ,st+ :>S't+i=5(st+i et+i
flO $+i|$)
2.A.3 Sketch proof of Theorem 2.1
Preliminary Lemmas:
Rewriting the state transition
(/(Si+ilSi) =  f  f(dst+l\Ss,q)d$(et+1) (2.2)
J st+i:St+i=S(st+i)+£t+i
=  /  p(dslt+1\St; q)...p(dsNt\St; g)d$(et+i)
J (s*4-i } : S t4 - i  =5fs*j-i }+e*-n
p(sit+i|St;g) =  /  p(sM+il5i*»aC(s«»'S't)>x(«ft»5,t)M ^ it|5 t;g ) (2.3)
J s i t
^ Sit t i€ { 0 ,l}
where f(S ) =  J^ xfoS^ d sIS ').
Lem m a 2.3 V(sit,S t) is continuous in q.
Proof. Follows from the definition of the Value Function 2.1 and the Envelope 
Theorem.
Lem m a 2.4 ac(sit , S t) is continuous in q.
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Proof. Standard dynamic programming argument.
Lem m a 2.5 £ (St) is continuous in q. 
Proof. Since £(5) =  f  x(s,S)g(ds\S).
x { s , S ’,q) =
1 if c <  c(s, S ; q) 
0 otherwise
Where we can define
c(s ,S ;q )/p  =  {E[V(st+ u S t+i)\at,Xt =  *1 “  B[V(st+i, St+i)\at , Xt =  0]|st,5 t}
=  l)q(St+i\St)dstdSt 
~ Is  Is ^ (s*+i> <S't+i)p(smlst7 g<j Xt =  0)q(St+i\St)dstdSt
[  / s ^ (s t+i ,5 t+i)p(st+i|s t,a c(st,5 t),Xi =  1 )dst 
=  / q{&t+i\bt)dot
~  Js v (st+i,St+i)p{st+i\st,a c(st j St),Xt =  0 )dst
and since c(s,S; q) is continuous in q (because V  is continuous in q and ac(s, S)  
is also continuous in q), then £(S ) will also be continuous in q.
C onjecture 1 g(sit \St) is continuous in q.
Since c is continuous in q as shown above, this means that for a small change 
in q, there is only a small fraction of firms affected by this as c also changes only 
slightly due to continuity (remind that ac(sit , S t) is also continuous in q). This 
means that the steady state distribution for sit will not have any discrete jump 
and is continuous in q.
P ro o f o f T heorem  2.1. From Lemmas 2.3-2.5 and conjecture 1, q(St+i\St) G 
O. as defined in 2.2 and 2.3, is a continuous self map on a non-empty compact and 
convex set H G BC[S_, 5] to which Schauder’s Fixed Point Theorem can be applied. 
This proves the result.
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Chapter 3 
Production Functions w ith  
Imperfect Com petition
In this chapter I address two common problems in the production function 
estimation literature. I will then use this to estimate Total Factor Productivity 
(TFP) in the remaining chapters. The first problem is input endogeneity and the 
second is the use of deflated sales as a proxy for output when there is imperfect 
competition. Using a demand system and allowing input demand to depend on 
the individual state variables as well as on the industry equilibrium I explain how 
to jointly recover the production function parameters and demand elasticity.
I analyze the effect of specifying a fully dynamic equilibrium model on esti­
mating the production function. The main problem that arises in an imperfect 
competition setting is that demand elasticity can no longer be recovered in the first 
stage as proposed by Levinsohn and Melitz (2005) and De Loecker (2007). This is 
due to the fact that input demand (either investment or materials) are functions 
of aggregate market conditions. I present evidence of the biased demand elasticity 
estimates.
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3.1 E stim ating production functions
The traditional approach to estimating production functions dates back to 
Cobb and Douglas (1928) and some of its problems, namely the endogeneity prob­
lem, have been detected since Marschak and Andrews (1944). Currently there 
have been some attempts to solve the input endogeneity problem either via pro­
ductivity control function (Olley and Pakes, 1995, henceforth O&P; Levinsohn and 
Petrin, 2003, henceforth L&P) or via dynamic panel data techniques (Bond and 
Soderbom, 2005, henceforth B&S). A second problem has been the use of revenues 
instead of physical output when markets are not perfectly competitive (Klette and 
Griliches, 1996). Recently De Loecker (2007) and Levinsohn and Melitz (2005) 
have proposed a framework which accounts for the two problems jointly. In this 
chapter I show that the methodology is inconsistent with a industry dynamic equi­
librium framework similar to Ericson and Pakes (1996). The main problem is that 
the demand elasticity cannot be recovered in the first step. I propose a way to 
deal with this problem by recovering demand elasticity in the second step.
Finally Buettner (2005) and Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2007) propose al­
ternative ways to relax the exogenous Markov process for productivity by allowing 
this to be controlled by R&D expenditures. In my case I allow productivity to fol­
low a controlled Markov process of a special form which depends only on whether 
firms are R&D performers or not.
3.1.1 Demand
Using the Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition framework demand can be 
written as:
Qi =  Y F ' - 1P7r' (3.1)
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Where f ^ J =  is total industry deflated revenues.
3.1.2 Production function
The production technology is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas with inputs capital 
(K),  labor (L) and a given productivity factor (uj)
Qi =  ew,L°K?  (3.2)
3.1.3 Productivity
Productivity is not directly observed but there are methods1 to estimate it 
as the residual from a production function estimation (Olley and Pakes, 1995; 
Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003; De Loecker, 2007). To be consistent with the theo­
retical model developed in chapter 2 I use a methodology similar to De Loecker 
(2007) which allows me to recover both the production function parameters and 
the demand elasticity when one uses deflated sales instead of quantities. The main 
problem with De Loecker (2007) is that it only works if input demand does not 
depend on market conditions which is true in a static or a single agent model. 
The reason for the inconsistency arises from the fact that input demand function 
depend on the industry state, more precisely on the aggregate industry state. This 
means that the elasticity of demand cannot be recovered in the first step since the 
input demand is also a function of the aggregate state and can only be recovered 
in the second step together with the capital coefficient. To see this notice that 
sales are P.Q  so taking the logs and using (3.1) and (3.2) from above (lowercase 
letters denote logs of their uppercase counterparts):
1Ackerberg et al. (forthcoming) provide a survey on the literature for estimating production 
functions.
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1 - V ~  1 ~ V — 1 / 7 7 N
Vit — Pit +  Qit — ~V t  H--------------Pt H--------------- \W a  4 -  Oikka  +  a il i t )  +  £u
V rt n
or
1 TJ — 1
Vit - p t  =  ~(Vt -  Pt) + -------(^.t +  OLkkit +  aikt) +  eit (3.3)
TJ T)
Instead of following directly De Loecker (2007), I use a version of his proposed 
technique but recover demand elasticity only in the second step. This is also similar 
to Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) using materials to control for the unobservable. 
The method is as follows. First, input demand is a function of individual states 
and the aggregate state.
mit =  m(cjit, kit, Rit, Vt) (3.4)
where Rit is a binary variable which denotes whether the firm is an R&D 
perfomer or not. Assuming invertibility this can be expressed as2
u it =  u(kit, Ru, yt , mu) (3.5)
and the unobservable is now a function of observables. Note however that since 
productivity is also a function of market conditions (yt) in 3.4, demand elasticity 
( tj)  cannot be recovered in the first stage, because it enters non-parametrically in 
the control function 3.5. This is the main difference from De Loecker (2007) where 
input demand depends solely on individual state variables (mu =  m(uJit , kit, Ru))-
Imposing that productivity is governed by a controlled first order Markov
2 A slight concern with invertibility and imperfect competition is the fact that with imperfect 
competition an increase in productivity might not lead to a direct increase in output and therefore 
in materials usage. For the demand system specified, an increase in productivity is equivalent 
to a decrease in costs and it translates directly into a decrease in prices (equation 4.21 in the 
Appendix to chapter 4). This means total output goes up and therefore also does materials 
usage.
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process we get
Wit — E[wit\wit~i, R n-1] +  vu
where vit is an independent and identically distributed random shock to pro­
ductivity.
Stage I
Prom above we can rewrite the production function as (deflating sales with the 
industry wide price pu yft =  yit -  pt)
v 1 _ D 77 — 1 /  7 77— 1
Vit — ~Vt "I \akht +  onlit) H--------- a)u +  Su
77 77 TJ
77 — 1 ~
&llit "b 4>(kity Riti 2ft 1 777<it) ~b £it
77
where
~ 1 77 — 1 77 — 1
Riti 2/fj 77lit) == ~Vt &kkit H w(kit, Riti jjP 1 771a )
77 77 77
And we can estimate this non-parametrically using an nth-order polynomial.
This provides estimates ^ a i  and 0.
Stage II
For the second stage I use the estimated values to construct
77 — 1
$it ~  Vit &lht
77
with this we can construct an estimate of for a given candidate
7 7 - 1  -  1 _ 77 — 1 ,
Wit — Pit — Vt H &kkit
77 rj 77
and approximate non-parametrically E[ojit\ojit_i, Ra-i] with an nth-order poly­
nomial
r}~ 1 /Hit Q-lHt
V
— —yt  +    Oikht +  E[uJit\uJit-i, R n - 1] +  Vu +  £itT) 77
1 _ 7] — 1
— —yt  H--------oikkit +
V r]
(3.6)
+
7o +  7i { i i t - i  ~  f a - i  ~  ^ U k h t - i j  
+ • • •  + 7 n  { ^ i t - i  ~  f a - i  ~  ^ a k h t - i )
7o +  7i ~  ^2/t-i ~  ^ o i k h t - i j  
+  —  + 7 n  ( ‘f e - l  “  f a - 1  -  ^ G k k i t - l )
+
+Vit -f £it
x 1 =  0]
x 1 [Rit^ =  1]
Using non-linear least squares allows us to finally recover an estimate for  ^ and 
Oik-
P oten tia l problem s in th e  second stage  For the second stage estimation 
to work, the error term of equation (3.6), v it +  £u, must be uncorrelated with kit 
and yt. While this might be a reasonable assumption for kit due to the timing of 
investment that makes ku independent from ’news’ in period t, the same is not 
necessarily true for yt if in the productivity shock vit there is an aggregate time 
component v t not captured by E[uit\LJit-i, Rit-i]- One potential instrument is the 
use of lagged yt- i .
I also acknowledge the criticism by Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2006) on the 
potential multicollinearity problem between la and (kit, Ra, yt, mu). I estimate
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the production function as proposed by Ackerberg et al. (2006) by recovering the 
labor coefficient in the second step and the results remain almost unchanged. The 
multicollinearity problem might actually not be severe if all we want is to recover 
an estimate for productivity and not for the production function coefficients.
A further problem is the sample selection due to exit. As explained by Olley 
and Pakes (1995), this selection problem arises if big firms are more likely to exit 
upon a negative shock which generates negative correlation between productivity 
and capital stock for the firms which remain in the industry. However, this fact is 
likely to be relevant in industries with severe exit behavior, but it is unlikely that 
this is true for industries with little exit.
3.1.4 Dynamic panel data literature (adjustment costs)
Somehow related, the dynamic panel data adjustment cost literature has evolved 
using advanced dynamic panel data specifications. Bond and Soderbom (2005) 
propose an adjustment cost model that can solve the multicollinearity problems 
between labor and materials has explained also in Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer 
(2006)3. Productivity is assumed to follow a particular first-order autoregressive 
Markov process. Since they do not specify R&D into their model, for comparison 
purposes I just assume two different AR(1) processes for R&D and non-R&D firms
p V .t - i  +  Vit if Ri,t-1 =  0 
+  Vit if Ri,t-1 — 1
This way quasi-differencing equation 3.3 above we get (where superscript p  
denotes deflated values and subscript j  denotes R&D status)
3Doraszelski and Jaumadreu (2005) propose the use of a parametric input demand spec­
ification to solve this problem. This parametric form arises naturally for the Cobb-Douglas 
production function case .
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V i t - P 1 Vi, (-1 = \  {ft -  p’f t - l )7]
j i   ^
H ~ ((^it P*^i,t—l) "h Olfc (^it P*ki,t—l) “I" a/ (/ft h,t—l))
+ £ <t -  f P£i ft—l  for j  =  0, 1
Or
yfi -  ^2/y-i =  ^ (i? -  P*5?-i) (3-7)
(tkfc (&i£ P*ki,t—l) “I" O!/ (/jt p /^i(t—i))
V
rj — 1
+ ------- *>« +  -  P ^ t - i
V
which I estimate using a system GMM estimator for dynamic panel models. 
I do this in two stages. In the first stage I estimate the full equation without 
imposing the constraint on the lagged variables for ku-i, ht-uVt-i
Vit =  *o2/£t-i +  A  Vt +  nifft-i +  +  K h t -1 +  +  K k t - i  +  Pa
I recover an estimate for fp =  ttq and in the second stage reestimate the model 
imposing the constraints on the parameters 7r7 from equation 3.7. I run this 
separately for R&D and non-R&D firms.
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OLS F ixed Effects
D ep enden t V ariable: log of deflated  value added
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
CoeL SE Pval Coef. SE Pval Coef. SE Pval Coef. SE Pval
l n ( L i t 0.74 0.03 0.00 0.76 0.03 0.00 0.69 0.04 0.00 0.70 0.04 0.00
l n ( K i t ) 0.24 0.02 0.00 0.23 0.02 0.00 0.25 0.03 0.00 0.22 0.03 0.00
l n ( Y t ) 0.08 0.02 0.00 - - - 0.07 0.03 0.01 - - -
C onst 6.36 0.26 0.00 7.69 0.23 0.00 6.53 0.27 0.00 7.80 0.32 0.00
O bservations 1038 1038 1038 1038
F irm s 227 227 227 227
Year dum m ies No Yes No Yes
L abor Coef 0.80 0.76 0.74 0.70
C ap ita l Coef 0.27 0.23 0.27 0.22
R e tu rn s  to  scale 1.07 0.99 1.01 0.93
P rice  C ost M argin 0.08 - 0.07 -
N otes: C olum ns (i) and  (iii) re p o rt resu lts  virithout tim e dum m ies and colum ns (ii) and  (iv) include tim e dum m ies
Table 3.1: Production function estimates using OLS and Fixed effects.
3 .2  R esu lts
In this section I compare the results for the alternative methodologies using 
data for the Portuguese Moulds Industry over the period 1994-2003 from a dataset 
collected by the Bank of Portugal.4
Table 3.1 contains the results for a simple OLS and fixed effects specification. 
In Table 3.2 I estimate the original O&P model using investment to control for 
productivity, using the original specification without time dummies in column (i) 
and with time dummies in column (ii), and allowing for imperfect competition 
recovering demand elasticity in the first stage (column (iii)) or in the second stage 
(column (iv)). Finally column (v) addresses the multicollinearity problem by re­
covering all the parameters in stage II. In Table 3.3 I reestimate the model using 
materials input to control for productivity as proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin. 
As for the 0&;P specification, columns (i) and (ii) assumes perfect competition, 
column (iii) estimates demand elasticity in the first stage, column (iv) allows ma­
terials demand to be a function of the aggregate state and recovers demand elas­
ticity in the second stage. Finally column (v) addresses again the multicollinearity 
problem by recovering all the parameters in stage II. In Table 3.4 I estimate the 
dynamic production function model as proposed by Bond and Soderbom. Finally
4See Appendix 4.A.3 and Section 4.5 for a description of the data and variable construction.
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D ep en d en t V ariable:
(i)
log o f defla ted  value added  
Coef. SE P val Coef.
(ii)
SE P val Coef.
(iii)
SE P val Coef.
(iv)
SE P val Coef.
(v)
SE P val
l n ( L it 0.62 0.03 0.00 0.84 0.03 0.00 0.62 0.03 0.00 0.63 0.03 0.00 0.65 0.06 0.00
I n ( K i t ) 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.27 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.91
l n ( Y t ) 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.23 0.07 0.00 0.26 0.08 0.00
700 -195.67 104.03 0.06 109.08 73.36 0.14 19.34 59.33 0.75 -32.31 27.25 0.24 -25.32 19.64 0.20
701 58.96 31.89 0.07 56.60 41.14 0.17 -4.86 18.84 0.80 14.55 11.15 0.19 11.41 7.11 0.11
702 -5.72 3.27 0.08 10.47 7.70 0.17 0.58 1.99 0.77 -1.89 1.57 0.23 -1.42 0.89 0.11
703 0.19 0.11 0.09 0.65 0.48 0.18 -0.02 0.07 0.79 0.09 0.08 0.24 0.06 0.04 0.11
710 -252.17 295.32 0.39 -219.54 443.04 0.62 -115.33 206.48 0.58 -90.76 87.68 0.30 -49.14 49.03 0.32
7 i i 72.88 85.22 0.39 -119.35 233.11 0.61 34.36 63.23 0.59 38.06 35.96 0.29 20.59 18.79 0.27
712 -6.84 8.20 0.41 -21.02 40.88 0.61 -3.22 6.45 0.62 -5.03 5.03 0.32 -2.59 2.47 0.30
713 0.22 0.26 0.41 -1.24 2.39 0.61 0.10 0.22 0.64 0.23 0.24 0.34 0.11 0.11 0.31
O bse rv a tio n s 1038 1038 1038 1038 1038
F irm s 227 227 227 227 227
P rice  C ost M argin 0.05 0.23 0.26
L ab o r Coef. 0.62 0.84 0.65 0.83 0.88
C a p ita l C oef 0.06 0.27 0.07 0.09 0.01
R e tu rn s  to  scale 0.68 1.10 0.72 0.92 0.89
N otes: C o lum ns (i) an d  (ii) p re sen t th e  re su lts  for th e  sim ple O P e s tim a to r  w ith  and  w ith o u t tim e  dum m is. C o lum n (iii) uses th e  m e th o d  p ro p o sed  by 
D e Loecker (2007) th a t  allow s for im perfec t co m p e titio n . C o lum n (iv) allow s for im perfec t co m p e titio n  b u t acknow ledges th a t  th e  ag g reg a te  s ta te  is p a r t  o f th e  
in v e stm en t func tion . F in a lly  in  colum n (v) acknow ledges th e  m u ltic o lin e a rity  prob lem  and  recovers all p a ra m e te rs  in th e  second stag e .
Table 3.2: Production function estimates using investment control (Olley and Pakes).
Table 3.5 provides a comparison for the different specifications.
The results in columns (vii) and (xii) of Table 3.5 confirm the bias in the 
estimates if demand elasticity is recovered in the first stage. The sign of the bias 
is a priori undetermined, however, a negative bias is consistent with a negative 
correlation between the aggregate demand shock and productivity (or positive 
correlation between average prices and productivity). This would be the case if 
for instance productivity, which can also be interpreted as quality, has a time 
component which is positively correlated with industry wide prices.
Notice also the bias in the labor and capital coefficients of both O&P and L&P 
in columns (v) and (x) when time dummies are not used and imperfect competition 
effects are not controlled for.
I have a preference for the L&P approach over O&P because of the labor 
coefficient bias in the first stage if the conditions for investment invertibility fail 
and productivity is not well controlled. This could be the cause of the upward 
bias in the labor coefficient with the O&P approach. Curiously, the Fixed Effect 
specification with time dummies in column (iv) performs very well and gives similar 
results to the preferred specification in column (xiii).
Using the methodology proposed by B&S the results for the capital and labor 
coefficients are similar. The only problem seems to be the estimate for demand 
elasticity. As for columns (vii) and (xii) this could be due to aggregate shocks 
being negatively correlated with productivity. Splitting the sample into R&D and 
non-R&D firms in columns (xvi) and (xvii) seems to suggest a higher mark-up for 
the R&D firms.
Note that the potential problem of multicollinearity using L&P as pointed 
out by Ackerberg et al (2006) and Bond and Soderbom (2005) does not seem to 
be a major concern since the labor coefficients recovered in the first stage are not 
significantly different from the ones using B&S (column (xv)). Also, the correction
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D e p en d en t V ariab le:
(0
log o f d efla ted  value added  
Coef. SE P val Coef.
(»)
SE P val Coef.
(iii)
SE P val Coef.
(iv)
SE P val Coef.
(v)
SE P val
I n ( L i t 0.58 0.03 0.00 0.73 0.03 0.00 0.61 0.03 0.00 0.61 0.03 0.00 0.61 0.06 0.00
l n ( K i t ) 0.25 0.03 0.00 0.39 0.02 0.00 0.21 0.03 0.00 0.19 0.03 0.00 0.20 0.04 0.00
Jn (Y t) 0.09 0.03 0.00 0.19 0.05 0.00 0.23 0.08 0.01
700 53.34 23.53 0.02 95.15 54.52 0.08 31.80 14.54 0.03 21.85 10.68 0.04 1.14 7.13 0.87
701 -19.00 9.61 0.05 38.44 24.87 0.12 -12.20 6.72 0.07 -11.24 4.95 0.02 -0.18 4.42 0.97
702 2.46 1.30 0.06 5.54 3.78 0.14 1.78 1.03 0.08 2.21 0.80 0.01 0.32 0.90 0.73
703 -0.10 0.06 0.09 0.27 0.19 0.16 -0.08 0.05 0.14 -0.13 0.05 0.01 -0.03 0.06 0.68
710 -379.86 540.11 0.48 -49.86 274.49 0.86 -369.55 400.58 0.36 -261.88 191.99 0.17 -59.72 70.25 0.40
7 n 132.66 196.84 0.50 -24.78 119.22 0.84 144.29 164.11 0.38 123.35 89.73 0.17 33.69 36.53 0.36
712 -15.19 23.89 0.53 -3.69 17.25 0.83 -18.50 22.38 0.41 -19.01 14.32 0.19 -5.92 6.60 0.37
713 0.58 0.97 0.55 -0.18 0.83 0.83 0.80 1.02 0.43 0.98 0.78 0.21 0.35 0.41 0.39
O bse rv a tio n s 1038 1038 1038 1038 1038
F irm s 227 227 227 227 227
P rice  C ost M argin 0.09 0.19 0.23
L ab o r Coef. 0.58 0.73 0.67 0.75 0.79
C a p ita l C oef 0.25 0.39 0.23 0.23 0.26
R e tu rn s  to  scale 0.83 1.11 0.89 0.99 1.06
N otes: C o lum ns (i) and  (ii) p re sen t the re su lts  for th e  sim ple LP e s tim a to r  w ith  and  w ith o u t tim e dum m is. C o lum n (iii) uses th e  m e th o d  p ro p o sed  by De 
Loecker (2007) th a t  allow s for im p erfec t c o m p e titio n . C o lum n (iv) allow s for im p erfec t c o m p e titio n  b u t acknow ledges th a t  th e  ag g reg a te  s ta te  is p a r t  
of th e  m a te r ia l d em an d  func tion . F inally  in colum n (v) acknow ledges the m u ltic o lin e arity  prob lem  and  recovers all p a ra m e te rs  in th e  second s tag e .
Table 3.3: Production function estimates using materials control (Levinsohn and Petrin).
(i) (ii) (iii)
D ep en d en t V ariable: log of deflated  value added
Coef. SE P val Coef. SE P val Coef. SE P val
0.85 0.11 0.00 0.94 0.17 0.00 0.73 0.13 0.00
I n ( K i t ) 0.22 0.09 0.01 0.23 0.10 0.02 0.27 0.09 0.00
in(yt ) 0.03 0.08 0.68 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.43
C onst 4.11 0.47 0.00 3.16 0.65 0.00 3.78 0.35 0.00
L ab o r C oef 0.88 1.06 0.77
C a p ita l  C oef 0.23 0.26 0.28
R e tu rn s  to  scale 1.11 1.32 1.06
P 0.42 0.41 -
AR1 te s t -3.73 0.00 -1.57 0.12 -4.22 0.00
A R2 te s t -0.26 0.79 1.20 0.23 -0.02 0.99
N otes: C o lum n (i) p resen ts  th e  re su lts  for th e  non-R D  firm s an d  co lum n (ii) for th e  RD 
firm s. C o lum n (iii) re p o rts  re su lts  im posing  sam e p ro d u c tio n  fun c tio n  and  dem and  for b o th  
RD and  non-R D  firm s.
Table 3.4: Dynamic production function estimates with AR1 productivity.
proposed by Ackerberg et al. (2006) where the labor coefficient is recovered in 
stage II does not change the overall results as we can see from columns (ix) and 
(xiv).
3.3 Fined com m ents
In this chapter I have addressed two common problems in the production 
function literature. The first is very well know and has been widely studied in the 
literature, relates to input endogeneity. The second is the problem of estimating 
production functions when competition is imperfect. Even though the problem 
has been addressed by Levinsohn and Melitz (2005) and De Loecker (2007), both 
have done this assuming input demand does not depend on industry conditions. 
If one expands this to a dynamic industry model, input demand will be a function 
of market conditions and demand elasticity can only be recovered in the second 
stage. I presented evidence that supports the bias in demand elasticity. One 
curious result is the good performance of a simple fixed effects specification with 
time dummies. I also have a preference for the Levinsohn and Petrin approach 
as compared to Olley and Pakes. This is due to the potential problems with 
investment inversion.
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M ethodo logy
L abo r C oef 
C a p ita l C oef 
P rice  C ost M argin  
R e tu rn s  to  scale
T im e dum m ies 
N otes
(0  (ii) 
OLS
0.80
0.27
0.08
1.07
No
(iii) (iv) 
F ixed  E ffects
(v) (vi) (vii) (v iii) 
O lley and  P akes
(ix) (x) (xi) (xii) (x i i i )  
L ev insohn  and  P e tr in
(xiv)
(a) Im p e rfe c t co m p e titio n , in p u t d em an d  in d e p en d en t on agg reg a te  shocks
(b) Im p e rfe c t co m p e titio n , in p u t dem an d  d e p e n d en t on ag g rega te  shocks
(c) Im p e rfe c t co m p e titio n , in p u t d em and  d ep e n d en t on ag g reg a te  shocks, M u ltico lin earity  co rrec tion
(d ) N on-RD  firm s
(e) RD firm s
(xv) (xv i) (xvii) 
B ond  an d  S oderbom
0.76 0.74 0.70 0.62 0.84 0.65 0.83 0.88 0.58 0.73 0.67 0 .7 5 0.79 0.77 0.88 1.06
0.23 0.27 0.22 0.06 0.27 0.07 0.09 0.01 0.25 0.39 0.23 0 .2 3 0.26 0.28 0.23 0.26
. 0.07 . . . 0.05 0.23 0.26 - - 0.09 0 .1 9 0.23 0.05 0.03 0.11
0.99 1.01 0.93 0.68 1.10 0.72 0.92 0.89 0.83 1.11 0.89 0 .9 9 1.06 1.06 1.11 1.32
Yes No Yes No Yes No No No No Yes No N o No No No No
(a) (b ) (c) (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Table 3.5: Summary table for production function estimates of labor, capital and demand elasticity coefficients using alternative 
methodologies.
Chapter 4 
Recovering the Sunk Costs of 
R&D: The Moulds Industry Case
4.1 Introduction
Even in narrowly defined industries R&D firms coexist with non-R&D firms. 
Since most existing theories focus in the continuous R&D choice rather than the 
discrete decision, they predict that in general, either all or no firms perform R&D 
(e.g. Cohen and Klepper, 1996; Klette and Kortum, 2004; Vives, 2004). In this 
chapter I explore the discrete decision to become an R&D firm using the framework 
developed in chapter 2. This allows me to deal with the ’curse of dimensionality’, 
typical of dynamic industry models. I achieve this by using an aggregate (payoff 
relevant) state to represent the state of the industry. This way, instead of keeping 
track of all individual competitors’ state, each firm just observes individual state 
and the aggregate state, considerably reducing the size of the state space.
The objective in this chapter is quantifying the magnitude of R&D sunk costs 
and their implications for industry R&D and innovation. I will estimate the sunk 
costs of R&D in a fully dynamic setting and I find these to be of significant mag­
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nitude (about 1.7 times the yearly average sales of a firm in the industry) using 
a dynamic equilibrium framework for productivity and physical capital accumula­
tion within a Monopolistic Competition setting.
In this area, several dynamic industry equilibrium models have been developed 
(Jovanovic, 1982; Hopenhayn, 1992; Ericson and Pakes, 1995; Klette and Kortum, 
2004). The most flexible of these models is the Ericson and Pakes (1995) since 
it allows for optimal R&D and investment choices. However, the model very 
easily becomes intractable due to the ’curse of dimensionality’. I will address this 
problem by summarizing the industry state in the aggregate (payoff relevant) state 
and estimate the model for a panel of firms in the Portuguese Moulds industry.
The literature on the estimation of dynamic industry models has received in­
creased attention with alternative estimators developed (Aguirregabiria and Mira, 
2007; Bajari, Benkard and Levin, 2007; Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry, forthcoming; 
Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler, forthcoming) and some successful applications 
to oligopolistic industries (Benkard, 2004; Ryan, 2005; Schmidt Dengler, 2007).
I use a forward simulation method similar to Hotz et al. (1994) as developed by 
Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007) which allows for both continuous and discrete 
actions. The estimation is done in three steps. In the first two steps I recover 
the static parameters (production function, demand elasticity, policy function and 
transition functions). By assumption, estimated policies are profit maximizing 
conditional on the equilibrium being played, i.e. the equilibrium observed in the 
data. I can then estimate continuation values by simulating industry paths far 
enough in the future using the estimated policies and transitions. By slightly 
perturbing the estimated policy functions I "construct” non-optimal policies and 
simulate alternative (non-profit maximizing) continuation values. With these op­
timal and non-optimal simulated continuation values and exploring the property 
that the value function is linear in the dynamic parameters, I can recover the
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parameters by imposing the equilibrium condition, i.e., that optimal values must 
be larger than non-optimal values. The linearity of the value function in the dy­
namic parameters allows the forward simulation to be done only once and not for 
each parameter value. This greatly reduces the burden of computing continuation 
values for each parameter set speeding up the minimization routine.
The minimum distance estimator explores the optimality condition by search­
ing for the parameters that minimize the cases where the values for the non-optimal 
policies axe larger than the values for the estimated policies. These are the para­
meters which are consistent with actual behavior being near optimal.
One alternative I have not explored here is the possibility of using a nested 
fixed point estimator as proposed by Rust (1987). The reason why this is compu­
tationally feasible is because conditional on equilibrium beliefs for the evolution of 
the industry state, agents solve a simple dynamic programming problem with just 
a few state variables. The equilibrium beliefs can be directly recovered from the 
data and parameters estimated using a single agent approach.1 However, contrary 
to the estimator I use here, the value function has to be solved for each parameter 
value, significantly increasing the estimation time from a few hours to some days 
or weeks of computations.
In order to implement the model, I directly test the validity of the assump­
tions. The main objective of introducing incomplete information into the model 
is to solve the ’curse of dimensionality’ problem by summarizing the industry 
state distribution into the aggregate industry state. This allows the restriction to 
Markovian strategies on own state and aggregate (payoff relevant) industry state 
to work. Even restricting to these type of strategies, the aggregate state transi­
tion might, in general, be a higher order process. However, problems occur if the
1The main problem with such approach is its computational cost even for the single agent case 
when there are several individual state variables. The reason is because we have to recalculate 
the value function for each set of parameters.
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(equilibrium) aggregate industry transition is not first order Markovian because 
we get history dependency and previous lags of the aggregate industry state add 
useful information about the expected future industry state. This can be checked 
by testing the significance of previous lags (t-2 and above) in predicting the aggre­
gate state. An alternative I have also explored is to test the significance of further 
moments of the individual variables distribution in predicting the evolution of the 
aggregate state.' If previous lags of the aggregate state and/or further moments 
of the individual variables distribution are not significant in predicting the aggre­
gate industry state, the assumptions are valid and there is no evidence of model 
misspecification.
The data I use has been collected by the Bank of Portugal ("Central de Bal- 
angos") for the period 1994-2003. This industry competes in the international 
market and exports 90% of its production, mainly to the automotive industry. The 
strategy adopted by most players has been to reinforce strong links with clients, 
to develop new materials (product innovation) and minimize waste (process in­
novation). Given the state of the industry, to survive competition firms should 
perform R&D since according to the experts it is the only survival strategy in the 
long run. The sector has developed partnerships with universities to achieve this 
and has been quite successful internationally. However, only a fraction of firms 
(around 40% in my sample for the year 2003) report positive R&D expenditures. 
Some under reporting could be occurring because the accounting rules to qualify 
as R&D expenditures are quite restrictive. However, under reporting by itself 
cannot explain such large fraction of firms not reporting R&D. I argue that sunk 
costs of R&D are significant, especially in this industry populated by many micro 
firms. Since the industry is populated by many small firms and the products and 
prices are contract specific, it fits very well in the assumptions for the theoretical 
model outlined in chapter 2.
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The Portuguese Moulds industry has been very successful and is recognized 
worldwide for its quality standards, technology and competitive prices. A 2002 
report by the US international trade commission (USITC, 2002) emphasizes the 
fast delivery, technology, quality and competitive price as the main strengths of the 
Portuguese Moulds Industry. There has been also a considerable effort in moving 
upstream in the value chain by supplying design and prototyping services jointly 
with moulds making. Some firms have also developed new materials with specific 
properties for making the moulds. This creates value for the clients since it allows 
them to reduce the costs of producing the final product (both in terms of rejection 
of pieces with defects as well as speed of production). This upstream move and 
technology shift requires considerable investment in Research and Development 
and it significantly increases productivity. However, only 40% of the firms in 
my sample have reported to do this. Using the estimation approach explained 
above, I estimate the size of the Sunk Costs required to rationalize this wedge in 
productivity.
Firm evolution within the industry is very stylized. First, most are founded as 
spin-offs by ex-employees (managers and engineers) who launch their own business. 
This is normally done at a very small initial size (less than 10 workers). If the firm 
is successful and able to secure some client base, it grows by incremental investment 
in producing capacity. Later in the life cycle, it might decide to increase supply of 
services to design and prototyping and also develop new products and materials 
which can be achieved by performing R&D.
There is a considerable cost of becoming a pro-active firm who besides produc­
ing moulds, is also able to supply their clients with moulds conception and design 
skills, mould testing and development of new materials, all at a competitive price. 
A successful innovative firm should be able to produce not only the mould itself 
but also deliver all the pre and post production services required by their clients.
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The costs can range from training and hiring of new employees, investment in 
new machinery and even the establishment of links with universities and public 
research agencies. These costs motivate the idea of sunkness since they cannot 
be recovered, particularly in this industry. Sunk costs can also easily explain why 
R&D firms are bigger than their non-R&D counterparts.
Sunk costs have for a long time been regarded as one potential source of in­
efficiency in the economy. The earlier literature puts most of the emphasis in 
the failure of the contestability theory in the presence of sunk entry costs. This 
results in market failures because the industry will not be competitive and firms 
can maintain some degree of market power (Baumol and Willig, 1981; Stiglitz, 
1987). The issue is of great importance for policy makers and regulators since 
the existence of sunk costs results in a market failure which induces the need for 
policy intervention.
Sunk costs of R&D, in particular, have been widely studied in the industrial 
organization literature, especially following the work by Sutton (1991, 1998). The 
main purpose of this research was to explore the relationship between R&D and 
market structure. Particularly, firms can use R&D as a strategic tool to create 
barriers to entry and maintain a dominant position even for large market size. One 
question raised by Schmalensee (1992) is how can an incumbent firm maintain a 
dominant position. In the cases R&D does not guarantee a permanent advantage, 
other firms can still leapfrog the incumbent because the barrier to entry will not 
last forever. However, the study of more complex dynamics for the outcome of 
R&D requires a fully dynamic model that goes beyond the two period approach. 
This type of framework however, was at the time in an early development stage. 
Dixit (1988) acknowledges this in his work
"Perhaps the most important aspect ignored here is the possibility of 
partial progress (state variables) in the R&D race. That has so far
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proved intractable at any reasonably general level, but remains an im­
portant problem for future research ". Dixit (1988: 326)
Finally, in the last section of this chapter, I evaluate the impact on investment, 
productivity and market structure of a reduction in the sunk costs of R&D. The 
results show that a 25% reduction in the sunk cost of R&D results in an expected 
1 1 % increase in average productivity and 18% increase in average capital stock.
4.2 R ecovering th e  sunk costs
To estimate the sunk costs of R&D, I use a model where firms sell differentiated 
products in a Constant Elasticity of Substitution demand environment. They can 
invest in both physical capital and decide to engage in R&D for which they have 
to pay a sunk cost. This sunk cost can go from building an R&D lab to the costs 
involved in internally changing the firm’s organization or even credit constraints. 
Finally potential entrants can enter and incumbents can exit.
4.2.1 State and action space
The state space sit for firm i at time t  is represented by four variables: Physical 
capital (K ), productivity (cu), R&D status (R, where R =  1 denotes that the firm 
has built the R&D lab and R =  0 otherwise) and operating status (x, where x  — 1 
denotes that the firm has decided to continue operations and x  =  0  denotes that 
it is not operating).
Sit =  {K i t i  Wit > -Rftj Xit)
where u it G f i ,a  compact set on the real number line and K a  G £, a compact 
set bounded below by 0. For the discrete decisions, Ra G {0 ,1}, Xit € {0 ,1}.
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There axe also stochastic shocks (privately observed by the firm and unobserved 
by the econometrician) including shocks to investment <p{t , to the sunk cost of 
R&D (fx, and the scrap value (pft . The vector of payoff shocks ipit =  (<p*t , <p#, (pft) 
are independent and identically distributed standard normal random variables.
After entering the industry, firms can invest in physical capital, pay a sunk 
cost and engage in R&D and finally decide on exiting from the industry. I denote 
the action space as a, where a superscript denotes either a continuous decision (c) 
such as investment levels or a discrete decision (d) such as starting an R&D lab 
or exiting the industry.
&it =  ~  {litj R it+ liX it+ l)
Investment, G 3  can be any non-negative number.
This generates a law of motion for the state variables that depends on the 
previous state and actions with density function
p(5it+l|Sj£, Q>it)
As will be discussed below, this law of motion will be stochastic for productivity 
and deterministic for all other state variables.
4.2.2 Parametrization
Per period returns are a primitive of the model which I specify as 7rit. St is the 
aggregate industry state (such as the industry price index), £it is an independent 
and identically distributed random transitory cash flow shock and p it is a vector 
of other stochastic shocks including price shocks to investment ip\t , to the sunk 
cost of R&D , and the scrap value <pft . The vector of payoff shocks <pit =  
(via Pit’ Pit) are independent and identically distributed standard normal random
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random variables.
I first define the demand and production functions and then, assuming Bertrand 
pricing, I solve for the reduced form period returns. The period return function 
satisfies Rust’s (1987) conditional independence and additive separability assump­
tions
7r(Sit, St, &it, f^it) St, CLu, £it) ^Piti i^t)
Dem and
I use the representative consumer Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition frame­
work 2. There are Nt available varieties each supplied by a different firm so there 
are Nt firms in the market and N —Nt potential entrants. Consumers choose quan­
tities of each variety Qi to consume and pay Pi with the following preferences:
\  TJ-l*7 —1
where [/(.) is differentiable and quasi-concave and Z  represents an aggregate 
industry utility shifter. Under these conditions the aggregate price index is
f  Nt \
P  =  ( X X (’’~1)J (4 1 )
and the firm’s demand is [see Appendix 4.A.1]
Q a = YtP r l p r  (4 .2 )
Where (Y  \ =  Yi=ip ‘Q'‘ ;g total industry deflated revenues. If the goods were
2 The model also works with other demand structures. A monopolistic competition framework 
is well adjusted for the cases when we do not observe firm level prices. More complex demand 
structures can be used when individual price data is available.
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perfect substitutes (77 is infinite), then there can be no variations in adjusted prices 
across firms, P% =  P  and ^  =  Qi for all firms.
Production function
The production technology is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas where L is labor 
input:
Qi =  ew‘L fK i  (4.3)
Since gross flow profits are fr =  [P(Qit)Qit — wLit] £it (w is the wage rate), so 
maximizing out for labor, this becomes:3
x(w « ,K it,S t\n,P) =  - [ J— ) Yt - ^ - ------4 ^ ,  (4.4)
where 7  =  (77—l)/(r}—a(rj—1)). Notice that since in the short run, productivity 
and physical capital are fixed, the only way to adjust production is through labor 
which is assumed to be perfectly flexible. I log-linearize this equation and estimate
In 7Tit =  <*0 +  otiLJit +  a 2 In K it +  a 3 In St +  In £it (4.5)
Productivity and R&D
I assume that productivity evolves stochastically with a different distribution 
for R&D performing and non-R&D performing firms. Firms who have built an 
R&D lab draw a productivity distribution that stochastically dominates that (in 
a first-order sense) of non-R&D firms. In general, product and process innovation 
are difficult to disentangle from each other unless one has firm level price data
3See Appendix 4.A.2.
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(e.g. Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson, 2008). Since in my data I do not have 
firm level price data I consider them to be indistinguishable in the model and 
restrict the analysis to the effect on productivity, u. The model can however be 
extended to allow for quality in the demand specification (see Melitz, 2000). This 
distinction would be important to model other type of phenomena like dynamic 
pricing, where the effects of product and process innovation would be qualitatively 
different.
This ‘internal’ source of uncertainty distinguishes R&D investment from other 
firm’s decisions like capital investment, labor hiring, entry and exit which have 
deterministic outcomes and where the only source of uncertainty is ‘external’ to 
the company (e.g. due to the environment, to competition, to demand, etc.). 
This distinction is important since the stochastic R&D outcome will determine 
(together with entry and exit) the stochastic nature of the equilibrium.
I assume that productivity follows a controled Markov process.
Wit+i =  Rn) +  Vit
where Va is independently and identically distributed across firms and time. 
C ost functions
Investm ent cost Investment costs are allowed to have a quadratic com­
ponent (Hayashi 1982) and total irreversibility. I assume that investment costs 
(CK (It , Kit- 1)) take the following form:
/2
Pl^it T fJ<2'K it- ,
+  (fljit  if lit >  o (4.6)
where /i2 >  0  indexes the degree of convexity and the ‘price’ of investment is 
Mi+ (Pit >  °-
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R & D  costs The firm has the choice of building an R&D lab at a sunk cost 
of A+ tp# where <p$ is an i.i.d. standard normal random variable. As discussed 
above I abstract away from the continuous R&D choice after building the R&D lab 
and assume that after building an R&D lab, R&D costs are a fixed proportion of 
firm sales. This is mainly for tractability so I do not need to keep track of another 
continuous policy function. However, the empirical literature tends to find that 
R&D intensity (R&D to sales ratio) is highly serial correlated - indeed Klette and 
Kortum (2004) take this as a stylized fact that they try and fit with their model. 
I assume that the process that determined period to period R&D flows leads to 
R&D being proportional to sales.
Notice that under these assumptions productivity evolves stochastically de­
pending on whether the R&D sunk cost have been paid or not, i.e.
p{u>i,t+i\uit,Rit,Xit)
where p(.) is the conditional probability of u^t+i given ujit, Rit and Xu•
E ntry cost Potential entrants are short lived and cannot delay entry. Upon 
entry, firms must pay a (privately observed) sunk entry fee of Ent  +  ipft to get a 
draw of uj with distribution p(ut+i\x t — 0) next period. The capital stock level 
upon entry is fixed K  — K_ and R =  0, i.e., firms enter the market with a capital 
stock of K_ and no R&D. Active firms take a value x  =  1 and inactive firms x  =  0-
E xit value Every period the firm has the option of exiting the industry and 
collect a scrap exit value of e -1- p s^ ap >
Payoff shocks The vector of payoff shocks ip =  (p1, p R, p E, p s ) are i.i.d. 
standard normal.
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State transition
As explained above productivity follows a controled Markov process. The 
capital stock depreciates at rate S and investment add to the stock:
Ki,t+ 1 — (1 — 8) Ku +  -fit
If a firm decides to start R&D, the sunk cost is paid only once and does not 
need to be paid ever again while the firm stays in the industry:
1 ii Ra =  1
R%,t+1 —
0  otherwise
If a firm exits it sets Xi,t+\ =  0 and if it enters it sets Xi,t+i — 1
Xi,t+ i
if Xu — 0 and firm i enters OR,
Xu =  1 and firm i stays 
if Xu =  0 and firm i does not enter OR, 
Xu — 1 and firm i exits
Period returns
Using the above specification I can write the per period return function
K iti  R iti Xiti  -f^ it+15 Xit+15 ^it: ^ t )  —
'  (  *M - * * * \ '
~~ ' _ (^ +  V u l l R i t + l  — R i t ) R i t + l  +  (1 — Xit+l)(e +  f i t )  J  *
- ( 1  -  X it)X it+ i(E n t  +  v f t )
Using the demand specified above (4.2) there are two ’external’ variables which
60
affect company’s revenues. One is market size (Y)  and the other is competitors’ 
adjusted price index (P ). Since individual prices are determined by productiv­
ity and physical capital (P* = P(uJi ,K i ,P ,Y) ,  see appendix), the price index is 
a mapping from individual firms’ productivity and capital stock onto a pricing 
function so that I get the final result for the aggregate state variable
St =  y(/ £ [ u , i(4 ] 7 (4.7)
j
It is important to recall that as explained before, firms adjust production to 
maximize short run profits through the only flexible input, labor.
4.2.3 Value function
The value function for the firm is
V (sit, St , ipit\q) =  sup h(sit, Ss, tpit, ait, Vu\ q)
where
h{sit, St, (Phi ^iti Viti q)
=  7T(Sjt, St,  &it) “I- (Piti&it) p E { V (Sff_|_i, S t+i ) \ s i t , Sf,  CLit', q \
su and ciit have been defined above and the expectation E[.\su, St ,ait', q] is 
taken over p(ujt+i\Xt =  tyq(St+i\St) if X =  0 and p(ujt+i\ut, Rt)q{St+i\St) if x  =  1- 
So the firms decide on next period capital investment (K t+i), R&D start-up (Rt+i) 
and next period operating status, i.e. entry and exit (x*+i)-
Firms optimally choose their entry, exit, R&D and investment given the knowl­
edge about the evolution of the industry q(St+i\St).
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There are two different value functions depending on the firm being an in­
cumbent (xu =  1 ) or a potential entrant (xa ~  0 )- For incumbents, the value 
function is the sum of current returns and the expected continuation value which 
depends on current individual state (s*t), current industry state (St) and actions 
taken (an). For the potential entrant the value function is either zero if it chooses 
to remain outside (Xit+i =  0 ) or the sum of the entry cost with the continua­
tion value which depends on the aggregate industry state (St) and the entry state 
distribution (p(sit+i\Xit =  °))*
4.3 T he estim ation  procedure
There are currently several proposed alternatives to estimate dynamic industry 
models in the recent surge of estimation techniques which extend the work of Hotz 
and Miller (1993) for single agent models (see Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler, 
forthcoming; Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2007; Bajari, Benkard and Levin, 2007; 
and Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry, 2007). I will follow the technique developed by 
Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007) since this allows for both discrete and continuous 
choices and is easily applicable to the model outlined above. This framework has 
been applied by Ryan (2006) to study the impact of environmental regulation 
changes on capacity investment for the cement industry in the US. The industry 
state is the sum of competitors’ capacities rather than the individual capacities of 
competitors and this resembles the model I am about to estimate.
The estimation proceeds in three steps. In the first step I recover the unob­
served productivity (ujit) via estimation of the production function. I consider a 
number of ways of estimating the production function (including Olley and Pakes, 
1996; Levinsohn and Petrin, 2002; Ackerberg et al, 2008, and Bond and Soderbom, 
2005), but I find these are broadly similar (see chapter 3). In the second step, I
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recover the profit function (7r(ojit, K it, St) as well as the micro-level and industry- 
level state transitions, and Q(St+i\St )). I also estimate the
equilibrium policy functions for investment, R&D and exit non-parametrically us­
ing a polynomial expansion in the state variables. Finally, in the third step, I 
impose the equilibrium conditions to estimate the linear and quadratic invest­
ment cost parameters, R&D sunk costs and exit costs i.e. the parameter vector 
(/ii,/i2,A,e).
By simulating actions and states from a starting configuration using the esti­
mated policies and state transitions, and collecting these paths through time, I 
can calculate the present value for a given path and a given set of parameters. 
Slightly perturbing the policy functions allows me to generate alternative paths 
and different present-values for a given parameter vector. The observed policy 
functions were generated by profit-maximizing firms who chose the actions with 
the highest expected discounted value. This means that at the true parameters, 
the discounted value generated by the observed actions should be greater than 
those generated by any other set of actions. Particularly, at the true parameters, 
the perturbed actions should give a lower expected value and this is the equilibrium 
condition which identifies the structural parameters.
My main interest is recovering the R&D sunk costs, A. Getting a good estimate 
of sunk costs of R&D is important because these will determine R&D performance 
and consequently innovation and productivity which are topics of extreme impor­
tance for policy makers. Second, these will have an effect on market structure and 
competition as explained by Sutton (1998).
For most industries, the R&D/Sales ratio is not very high (between 2% and 
5%). This is puzzling if we recall that only a fraction of the firms actually perform 
R&D. The reason must then be that either the returns to R&D are too low or 
that there are very high costs involved which prevent firms from engaging in R&D
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(credit constraints could also be a cause and I will investigate this in the next 
chapter). With all dynamic cost parameters recovered, I can then do some policy 
analysis to study changes in the amount of R&D and industry structure when the 
sunk costs of R&D change.
One hotly debated (and unsolved) issue is the link between competition and 
R&D performance. Aghion et al. (2005) provide a theoretical explanation and 
some empirical evidence arguing that there is an inverted U-shape relationship 
between these two, whereby innovation is higher for mid levels of competition 
but lower for either very competitive or weakly competitive industries. Blun­
dell, Griffith and Van Reenen (1999), by contrast, find that the pre-innovation 
effect dominates. However, since both market structure and R&D performance 
are jointly determined in equilibrium, it is not easy to disentangle these effects 
without a dynamic model that addresses the market structure endogeneity issue.
4.3.1 Step 1: Productivity
In the first two steps I recover the static parameters (production function, 
demand, policies and transitions). This then allows me to compute the per period 
returns, simulate actions for a given state using the estimated policies and update 
the states using the transitions which will be the hearth of the third step.
Productivity is not directly observed but there are methods4 to estimate it 
as the residual from a production function estimation (Olley and Pakes, 1995; 
Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003; De Loecker, 2007). To be consistent with the theo­
retical model developed in chapter 2 I use a methodology similar to De Loecker 
(2007) which allows me to recover both the production function parameters and 
the demand elasticity when one uses deflated sales instead of quantities. The main
4Ackerberg et al. (forthcoming) provide a survey on the literature for estimating production 
functions.
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problem with using the De Loecker (2007) method naively is that it only works if 
input demand does not depend on market conditions which is true in a static or 
a single agent model. The reason for the inconsistency arises from the fact that 
input demand function depend on the industry state, more precisely on the aggre­
gate industry state. This means that the elasticity of demand cannot be recovered 
in the first step since the input demand is also a function of the aggregate state 
and can only be recovered in the second step together with the capital coefficient. 
To see this notice that sales are P.Q so taking the logs and using (4.2) and (4.3) 
from above (lowercase letter denote logs of their uppercase counterparts):
1 -  — 1 _ r] — 1 / . . .
Vit — Pit +  Qit — —2/t H----------Pt 4 \Wit +  otkkit +  otilit)T) T) T)
or
Hit — Pt =  ~ (y t  — Pt) +  — {uju +  otkku - f  onht)
77 77
Instead of following directly De Loecker (2007), I use a version of his proposed 
technique but recover demand elasticity only in the second step. This is also similar 
to Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) using materials to control for the unobservable. 
The method is as follows. First, input demand is a function of individual states 
and the aggregate state
m it =  m fa i t ,  kit , Rit,  Vt) (4.8)
Assuming invertibility this can be expressed as5
5 A slight concern with invertibility and imperfect competition is the fact that with imperfect 
competition an increase in productivity might not lead to a direct increase in output and therefore 
in materials usage. For the demand system specified, an increase in productivity is equivalent to 
a decrease in costs and it translates directly into a decrease in prices (equation 4.21 in appendix). 
This means total output goes up and therefore also does materials usage.
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^it  ^ (k it i  Hu, 2/t) Wlit) (^**0
and the unobservable is now a function of observables. Note however that since 
productivity is also a function of market conditions (yt) in 4.8, demand elasticity 
(77) cannot be recovered in the first stage, because it enters non-parametrically in 
the control function 4.9. This is the main difference from De Loecker (2007) where 
input demand depends solely on individual state variables (mu =  m(uju, ku, Ru))-
Imposing that productivity is governed by a controlled first order Markov 
process we get
^ it  1) Hit—l] 4“ ^it
where v it is an independent and identically distributed random shock to pro­
ductivity.
Stage I From above we can rewrite the production function as (deflating sales 
with the industry wide price pt, y?t =  yu — pt)
v 1 77 — 1 , T 77— 1
Pit — ~Vt “I (oikkit +  Oulu) H U u  +  £u
77 77 77
77 — 1
Oillit “t" 4>(kit, R iti  Vt j TH'it) “1“ £it
where
1 71 — 1 71 — l
4*(kiti H it iP t  i'ffl/it) == ~Vt 4 &kkit H k)(ku, R u , y ^ , m u )77 77 77
And we can estimate this non-parametrically using an Tith-order polynomial. 
This provides estimates and 4>.
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Stage II For the second stage I use the estimated values to construct
Tj — 1
iPit =  Vit °L ht
V i
with this we can construct an estimate of ^ f o r  a given candidate
and £
r j - 1  1 1 .  r j - 1
^it Wit Vt O^ k^ itrj 7] rj
Using this we can approximate non-parametrically E[ua\ujit-ii Rit-i] with an 
nth-order polynomial
r j -  1 
Hit &lnt
V
1 ~ 7] — 1
=  ~Vt H--------- otkkit +  +  Vit +  Su
7] 7]
1 _ Tj—1
— ~Vt H--------- otkkit +7) 7]
(4.10)
+
7o +  7? ( f c - i  _  jjVt-1 ~  ^OLkht-i)  
+ •“ + 7 n (fiit- 1 “  J^t-l _  ^ ^ k h t - 1)
7o +  7i ( f e -1 -  ^2/t-i -  
+••• +  7 i  ( f e - i  ~  ^2/t-i “  ^ Q k k i t - i )
+
+^ii +  £it
X 1 =  0]
X 1 [ R u - !  =  1]
2ZnL
Using non-linear least squares allows us to finally recover an estimate for  ^ and
Oik•
P oten tia l problem s o f th e  second stage  For the second stage estimation 
to work, the error term of equation (4.10), v it +  £it: must be uncorrelated with kit 
and yt . While this might be a reasonable assumption for kit due to the timing of 
investment that makes kit independent from ’news’ in period t, the same is not
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necessarily true for yt if in the productivity shock v it there is an aggregate time 
component v t not captured by E[uJit \uJit- i ,R i t-i\- One potential instrument is the 
use of lagged yt.
I also acknowledge the criticism by Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2006) on the 
potential multicollinearity problem between la and (ku, Ra, Vt, ^u)- I estimate 
the production function as proposed by Ackerberg et al. (2006) by recovering the 
labor coefficient in the second step and the results remain almost unchanged. The 
multicollinearity problem might actually not be severe if all we want is to recover 
an estimate for productivity and not for the production function coefficients. To 
address this multicolinearity problem I also use the method proposed by Bond and 
Soderbom (2005).
A further problem is the sample selection due to exit. As explained by Olley 
and Pakes (1995), this selection problem arises if big firms are more likely to exit 
upon a negative shock which generates negative correlation between productivity 
and capital stock for the firms which remain in the industry. However, this fact is 
likely to be relevant in industries with severe exit behavior, but it is unlikely that 
this is true for industries with little exit.
4.3.2 Step 2: Policies and transitions 
P olicies
With all state variables recovered (lj, K , Y , R ), the policy functions can be 
easily estimated. The investment function which results as the solution to the 
dynamic problem is
T * f  d E ( V ( s i t + i 1Yt+ i \ s i t ,Y t ,Ri t ,Q>i t ) )  \  1 i  (A
=  2jU2 (  --------------------- 0 4  ( }
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which I estimate separately for R&D and non-R&D firms as
Ht — P n(^iti Kit, Yt , Pit) +  (fit (4.12)
where P n(.) is an nt/l-order polynomial. I have tried different degrees for the 
polynomials and there is a clear preference over polynomials with smaller degrees
because they produce policy functions with less noise. Since errors in the pol­
icy functions enter nonlinearly in the third step, this can significantly bias the 
estimates in small samples.
For the R&D equation, I estimate it with a probit model where firms will 
decide to start doing R&D if
. R. P{Y(Sit+l,Yt+l)\Sit,Yt , lit, Rit+1 — 1} 
(A +  <p5 ) < p
So the probability that the firm starts performing R&D is
Pr(Pjt+1 — 1|Rn — 0,Sit,Yt , In) —
i r
E{V(sit+i,Yt+i)\Pit+i — 1} 
-E{V(sit+ i, Yt+i)\Rit+i =  0} j
Pr <pg < -A  +  p 
\
or since (p$ is assumed to be a standard normal random variable
E{V(sit+ i,Y t+i)\Rit+i — 1} 
-E {V(sit+ i, Yt+i)\Rit+i =  0}
Pr(Pit+i — 1| Pit — 0) — —A +  p
which I approximate by
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Pt(Rtt+1 =  1 ^  =  0) =  $  (p " K >  K it, Yi, Pit)) (4.13)
where again P n(.) is again an nthorder polynomial.
The exit function can be treated in a similar way resulting in
P r fe t+1 =  0 |Xj( =  1) =  4> ^Pn(u)a, Kit, Yt, Rit)) (4.14)
The transition function
Aggregate state From Corollary 2.2 the observed aggregate state has a con­
ditional normal distribution with mean Pst+i\st — (1 — Ps)Ps +  Ps$  and variance
&St+i\St — ^5(1 — Ps)1/2' Where (/x5 , <Ts, ps ) are respectively the rmconditional
mean, variance and autocorrelation for the S  process and are easily estimated 
from the data.
Productivity Since the model does not impose any parametric restrictions on 
the transition for individual productivity, I estimate it separately for R&D and 
non-R&D firms using a polynomial on lagged productivity (gRD(uJi>t- i ) } gNRD(uji}t- i ) ) .
Wi,t+1 = E(Ui}t+l\Wit, Pit) + £u+l = a 0 + a \ u it +  + a 3u it + £it+1 ( -^15)
which is estimated separately for R&D firms and non-R&D firms
4.3.3 Step 3: Minimum distance estim ator
Assuming the policy and transition functions are consistently estimated, start­
ing from a state configuration (s0, So), I can draw vectors of payoff shocks ip =
(ip1 ,(pR,(ps ), simulate actions (a0) by reading off the estimated policy functions
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and update states (si, Si) by reading off the estimated transition functions. Doing 
this for long periods (each path has been simulated for T  periods), I compute a 
sequence of actions and states {at(so, So, ip0), st (so, So), St (s0, So)}J=i from a start­
ing configuration (I have used ns different starting configuration combinations 
for (so, So)). With this sequence of actions and states, I can compute the dis­
counted stream of profits for a given parameter vector 9 and a given second step 
estimate for the policy and transition function (a), Y^t=o Pt7r(ati st, St , tpt ', ot, 9) 
which gives me an estimate of the expected value from a starting configuration 
E V (so, So; ol, 9) =  J2t=o Pt/K(at> st ,S t ,(pt ; a, 0).6 For each starting configuration I 
simulate n j  different paths to get an average estimate
1 n j  T
EV(s0, S0; a, 9) =  —  V  V  p‘w(ai, 4 , S 3t M ;  &, 9)
nj U t Z
In order for a strategy, a, to be an equilibrium it must be that for all o' ^  a
y ( s ,S ; a ,g(St+1|S();0) >
So the set of dynamic parameters 6, must rationalize the strategy profile a. I 
just consider the case where 0 is point identified whereas Bajari et al. (2007) also 
develop the method for (bounds) set identification on 6.
Given the linearity of the value function on the dynamic parameters I can write
V(s, S ; a, q(St+1\St)\ 9) =  W(s, 5; a, q(St+1\St)) * 9 
where W {st , St; a, q{St+i\St)) =  Ea\SuSt PSwt and e =  I1* Mi, M2, el> wt =  
[7r(ss, Ss; rj), Is, I g , l (R s+i =  1 ,R S =  0 ) , l ( x a+1 =  0 ,xs =  1)] •
I construct alternative investment, R&D and exit policies (cr') by drawing a
61 set the discount factor at p =  0.92 which is in line with other studies. The estimate for 
the sunk costs is sensitive to the choice of the discount factor. The magnitude of this effect is 
insignificant for my purpose.
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mean-zero normal error and adding it to the estimated second step policies. With 
these non-optimal policies I construct alternative expected value following the 
same procedure as before to get W(so, So, <*'•> 0 (0 )  P  calculate these values for na 
alternative policies).
I then compute the differences between the optimal and non-optimal value 
functions for several (X*) policies and states (Xk, k =  1, ...nj), where n / =  na * ns
* 9
Since the estimated policies should be optimal, the expected value when using 
a  should be bigger then using alternative a'. The empirical minimum difference 
estimator minimizes the square of the violations (g(x , 6, a) <  0)
1
3(0-,a) =  —  y '(m in { § (X fc;0,Q!),O}):
71/ L '
and
k=l
1 ni
6 =  argmin —  V  (min {g (X *; 6, a), 0})2 
eee n ,  ^
Notice that I set the length of each path T  — 100, the number of starting 
configurations ns =  100, the number of simulations for each configuration nj  =  150 
and the number of alternative policies na — 200, so that I get the number of 
differences nj =  20,000
Standard errors
Since the estimated parameters in the first two steps are used in the third step, 
the standard errors of the parameters are determined by the first stage standard 
errors. The easiest way to estimate them is to use sub-sampling or the bootstrap. 
An important remark is that there is simulation error. Since bootstrapping re-
72
quires very intense computations, the bootstrapped standard errors are an upper 
bound to the true standard errors since they are a mixture of estimation and 
simulation error.
Optim ization
When the objective functions lacks smoothness (e.g. problems with discontin­
uous, non-differentiable, or stochastic objective functions) using derivative based 
methods might produce inaccurate solutions. For this reason, to minimize the em­
pirical minimum distance (J) I use a derivative free optimization method (Nelder- 
Mead) which circumvents this problem. Non-smoothness might occur with finite 
n j, because of the min operator in the objective function, J, which takes only the 
negative values of g(.) and this creates discontinuities even if g() is continuous in
e.
4.3.4 Identification
Identification of the static parameters follows the identification strategy used 
in De Loecker (2007) with the main difference that the demand elasticity cannot 
be recovered in the first stage since it enters the input demand function (in order 
to be consistent with the model above). Therefore, as explained above, both the 
capital coefficient and demand elasticity are recovered in the second stage.
The sunk costs of R&D are identified from the observed R&D decisions. Un­
der the assumption that observed actions are profit maximizing, the sunk costs 
of R&D are identified through the comparison between observed (optimal) be­
havior and alternative (non-optimal) behavior. Given the observed profits earned 
by R&D firms and non-R&D firms, we can recover the value of being an R&D 
firm and compare this with the R&D behavior observed in the data. Similarly, 
investment costs and exit values axe estimated from the observation of optimal
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behavior and comparing with non-optimal behavior. So the identification of the 
dynamic parameters is achieved by comparing actual with alternative actions. 
Note that if policies are estimated with error, the parameters might be incorrectly 
estimated. Because of this I have chosen polynomials of lower degree (1st and 
2nd) to approximate the policy functions.
A second potential problem is that the parameters are only identified provided 
there are no unobservable state variables. This is actually a potential concern and 
a reason why one might consider the use of a fixed effects specification in the first 
step, an issue currently under research.
4.4 T he m oulds industry
The Portuguese moulds industry is a case study of success and ability to com­
pete in a global environment. The industry exports 90% of its production and 
supplies 60% of its production to the very competitive car manufacturing indus­
try accounting for more than 1% of total Portuguese Exports (CEFAMOL, 2005). 
The main advantage of the industry is the ability to produce complex moulds 
which require advanced technology at a low cost and high quality (USITC, 2002).
"Despite Portugal’s small size, it has emerged as one of the world’s 
leading exporters of industrial molds. In 2001, despite limited pro­
duction of dies, Portugal was the eighth largest producer of dies and 
molds in the world and it exports to more than 70 countries. The 
Portuguese TDM industry’s success in exporting, and in adoption of 
the latest computer technologies, has occurred despite the fact that 
Portugal has a small industrial base on which the TDM industry can 
depend. Since joining the EU in 1986, Portugal has focused on serving 
customers in the common market." (USITC, 2002)
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There has been a considerable effort of improvement and investment over the 
last 15 years. There has been three ways how firms have successfully improved 
performance and developed new skills. Firstly, there has been an upstream move 
in the value chain. By supplying design and propotyping services, the firms have 
been able to provide valuable services which reduce the cost of production to their 
clients. Secondly there has been an orientation towards lean manufacturing and 
waste minimization which has been influenced by clients in the car manufacturing 
industry and management practices adopted by them. Finally some firms have 
been in close contact with universities and research labs for the development of 
new materials. Even though this upstream move and technology shift requires 
considerable investment in Research and Development, only 40% of firms in the 
industry perform R&D and these firms are also considerably more productive 
(more then 40%).
The history of the industry dates back to the 1930’s and 1940’s when the devel­
opment of plastics created a great demand for plastics’ moulds. The Portuguese 
moulds industry started to fill this need in the late 1950’s as a major producer of 
moulds for the glass (where it inherited some of its expertise) and specially for the 
toy manufacturing industry. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 provide some examples of what 
moulds looked like during this period. From the late 1970’s there was a dramatic 
increase in production mainly driven by the export market, as reported in Figure 
4.3, with the sector currently representing around 1% of the total country’s ex­
ports. In the late 1980’s the production shifted from toy manufacturing towards 
the growing industries of automobiles and packaging. Figure 4.4 shows the ex­
port composition (share of total exports), by main client/product type between 
1984 and 2004 and it is clear the increasing importance of the Car Manufacturing 
industry and decreasing importance of the Toys and Home Electricals industries. 
During the 1990’s the biggest export markets started shifting from the US towards
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Figure 4.2: Metals’ mould (1950’s): Spoon
France, Germany and Spain. (IAPMEI, 2006).
During this period the industry suffered several changes both in terms of num­
ber of firms with a big increase in the early 1980’s and a shift towards other main 
clients due to the boom of the plastics and packaging sectors. This put pressure 
for the introduction of new technologies (e.g. CAD, CAM, Complex process, In­
mould Assembling) and an increasingly importance of innovation and R&D. For 
example, Figure 4.5 shows a computer operated machine for building moulds which 
is radically different from the techniques used in the 1970’s and 1980’s. This state 
of the art machinery allows flexibility at a low cost besides a close collaboration 
with the client in the pre mould construction phase. The design teams can work 
closely with the clients’ engineers and produce 3D virtual versions of the mould 
which are then programed into the machine to start production.
The sector is mainly populated by small and medium firms as we can see from 
Figure 4.6. In 2004, Portugal was the 9th biggest world exporter and 3rd European 
exporter (Figure 4.7). The industry invests in R&D and has established close links
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Figure 4.3: Portuguese moulds exports: World (blue) and US (green) totals 1960- 
2001 (millions of euros)
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Figure 4.4: Portuguese moulds exports: Composition (share of total exports), by 
client/product type for 1984-2004
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Figure 4.5: CNC (computer numerical control) machine used in production of 
moulds (2006)
with universities.
Wikipedia provides a quote about a Portuguese moulds manufacturer (SIMOLDES) 
which illustrates the importance of the industry:
Simoldes is a Portuguese mould maker company headquartered in Oliveira 
de Azemeis.
Considered to be Europe’s largest mould maker, Simoldes Group Mould
*. * * 
motive industry. ("http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simoldes)
istry (and most However, a puzzling fact about the Portuguese moulds indi
; in 2003 report industries in general) is that only 40% of the firms in my sampl
wage countries. positive R&D expenditures. With increasing competition from low
Figure 4.6: Firm size distribution: Number of workers per firm for the period 
1994-2003
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firms not performing any R&D? The potential reason I will explore is the existence 
of R&D sunk costs.
Each mould is (quasi) unique, prices depend on the mould specification and 
are typically contract specific and agreed between the producer and the client. 
Therefore, individual prices are not observed but even if they were observable it 
would be difficult to compare them due to the product nature. Most firms establish 
close cooperative relations with their clients in order to improve product quality. 
Firms tend to specialize in a particular type of mould and therefore potential 
clients approach firms with the expertise in their product, but the technology is 
sufficiently flexible and allows them to produce most types of moulds. For this 
reason the industry fits very well within the monopolistic competition framework. 
This is appropriate since firms sell a differentiated product and along this product 
dimension they have some degree of market power. The assumption that firms 
react to aggregate movements in the industry and not to any particular competitor 
is not unreasonable because the market is quite fragmented. The incomplete 
information is not violated since firms do not directly observe their competitors 
prices or productivity. Because of all these facts, the industry fits very well in the 
framework developed in chapter 2.
I have observations for both large and small firms but I do not observe all firms 
in the market since the data is collected through a sampling procedure. These type 
of datasets are very common and as explained before the complete information 
model might have problems because of the non-observed players. However, for the 
incomplete information case, I just need to observe aggregate variables which are 
available from the National Statistics Office (INE). Another important advantage 
of the Portuguese Moulds Industry is the fact that I observe R&D behavior and 
this is what will identify the R&D sunk costs.
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Y e a r N u m b e r  
o f  f i rm s
N u m b e r  o f  n o n  
R D  f i r m s
N u m b e r  o f  
R D  f ir m s
R D  s t a r t - u p s E n t r y E n t r y  in  t h e  
d a t a s e t
E x i t s
1994 144 134 10 - 2 3 0
1995 157 137 20 10 12 14 2
1996 165 141 24 4 8 14 0
1997 170 145 25 2 11 20 2
1998 164 135 29 7 9 33 0
1999 136 108 28 3 2 46 1
2000 92 68 24 7 2 8 0
2001 88 56 32 9 1 5 0
2002 88 53 35 4 1 2 0
2003 86 48 38 3 0 0 2
T o ta l 1290 1025 265 49 48 145 7
Table 4.1: Firms, Entry, Exit and RD data, totals per year.
4.5 T he data
The data is part of a database compiled yearly by the Portuguese Central 
Bank ("Central de Balangos"). I have extracted the observations for the period 
between 1994-2003 for the five-digit NACE (rev 1.1) industry, 29563. This data­
base collects, financial information (balance sheet and P&L) together with other 
variables like number of workers, occupation of workers (5 levels), total exports, 
R&D, founding year and current operational status (e.g. operating, bankrupt, 
etc). I have also collected industry aggregate variables for sales, number of firms, 
employment and value added from the Portuguese National Statistics Office (INE,
2007) and industry price data from IAPMEI (2006).
4.5.1 Descriptive statistics
The dataset has 231 firms over the period 1994-2003 and 1,290 observations. 
There are 265 observations with positive R&D that corresponds to 59 firms. I 
observe 49 cases of R&D start-ups after 1994 (defined as a firm not reporting 
R&D ever before in the sample). On average, an R&D firm reports positive R&D 
for 2.5 consecutive years (Tables 4.1 and 4.2).
Due to the short nature of the panel, there are few observations on entry and 
exit. A further complication arises due to the way data has been collected. Since 
answering the questionnaire is not compulsory, some firms might not be reported in
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C o n s e c u t iv e  N u m b e r  o f  
R D  y e a r s  f i rm s
0 172
1 26
2 12
3 6
4 6
5 2
6 6
7 28 1
Table 4.2: RD spans: Number of consecutive years of positive reported RD.
the dataset but still be active in the industry. This complicates the identification 
of exiting firms and entrants since the firms might enter the dataset but could 
have been operating in the market before first appearing in the dataset. I address 
these problem with two variables that help to identify entry and exit. For entry, 
firms report their founding year so I match the founding year with the year the 
firm first appeared in the sample and if it is within a 2 year window I consider it 
to be a new entrant (this is reported in Table 4.1 under the column entry in the 
industry). Regarding exit, the central bank collects a variable that reports the 
"status" of the firm. The problem with this variable is that some firms that might 
have closed down are still reported as "active", so I can only capture a fraction of 
the total exits. Using this methodology I identify a total of 48 entries and 7 exits 
from the panel.
In Tables 4.3 and 4.4 I present some summary statistics for the main variables. 
The average firm in my sample sells 1.5 million Euros and employs 33 workers 
with an average labor productivity of 20,427 euros. Over the period 1994-2003, 
real sales have grown at an average 9.9% and labor productivity at 6%.
After a decline until 1998, the total number of firms in the industry has grown 
up to a maximum of 738 in 2003, employing 8,766 employees. The industry is 
populated by small and medium firms and there are no market leaders.
R&D performers are normally larger and older and their labour productivity 
is on average 20% higher.
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Y ear
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
V a r i a b l e  M e a n  P ( 5 0 )  S t d .  D e v .  M i n  M a x
Sales (E U R ) 1,575,080 699,394 2,869,985 3,292 34,700,000
V alue A dded  (E U R ) 795,083 390,753 1,439,538 494 15,200,000
E m ploym en t 33 20 39 1 258
C a p ita l  S tock  (E U R ) 785,655 296,575 1,551,721 135 15,500,000
L ab o r P ro d u c tiv ity  (E U R ) 20,427 19,234 9,039 386 74,632
R D /S a le s  ra tio 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.47
Sales grow th 0.09 0.08 0.34 -1.69 4.69
V alue added  grow th 0.10 0.07 0.39 -2.66 4.77
L ab o r p ro d u c tiv ity  grow th 0.06 0.05 0.35 -2.66 2.84
N o n - R D  f irm s
Sales (E U R ) 1,198,259 551,273 2,319,458 3,292 26,800,000
V alue A dded  (E U R ) 641,511 310,656 1,291,371 494 11,800,000
E m ploym en t 27 17 35 1 230
C a p ita l  S tock  (E U R ) 650,823 208,792 1,444,562 135 15,100,000
L ab o r P ro d u c tiv ity  (E U R ) 19,663 18,239 9,178 386 74,632
R D /S a le s  ra t io 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sales grow th 0.10 0.09 0.37 -1.69 4.69
V alue added  grow th 0.11 0.08 0.43 -2.66 4.77
L ab o r p ro d u c tiv ity  grow th 0.07 0.05 0.39 -2.66 2.84
R D  f irm s
Sales (E U R ) 3,002,735 1,764,672 4,066,477 99,206 34,700,000
V alue A dded  (E U R ) 1,376,916 845,023 1,785,470 45,924 15,200,000
E m ploym en t 52 37 45 3 258
C a p ita l  S tock  (E U R ) 1,296,492 837,083 1,818,168 23,508 15,500,000
L ab o r P ro d u c tiv ity  (E U R ) 23,321 22,462 7,861 7,148 59,923
R D /S a le s  ra tio 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.47
Sales grow th 0.06 0.06 0.20 -1.02 1.23
V alue added  grow th 0.06 0.06 0.20 -1.13 1.02
L abo r p ro d u c tiv ity  grow th 0.04 0.04 0.20 -0.87 1.17
Table 4.3: Summary statistics, all firms and by RD status.
N u m b e r  E m p lo y m e n t  S a le s  (E U R )  V A  ( E U R )  P r i c e  P r i c e  S a le s  V A
o f  f i rm s  I n d e x  V a r ia t io n  G r o w t h  g r o w th
644 5,133 171,300,000 152,600,000 96.7
570 5,796 193,400,000 172,300,000 100.0 0.03 0.13 0.13
452 7,316 244,200,000 217,500,000 101.8 0.02 0.26 0.26
477 7,821 292,700,000 246,200,000 101.9 0.00 0.20 0.13
461 7,740 322,400,000 258,800,000 97.5 -0.04 0.10 0.05
549 8,429 362,200,000 277,300,000 99.9 0.02 0.12 0.07
604 8,879 411,800,000 299,300,000 104.9 0.05 0.14 0.08
612 8,919 421,000,000 368,800,000 105.9 0.01 0.02 0.23
722 9,312 378,000,000 359,200,000 98.9 -0.07 -0.10 -0.03
’ 738____________ . 8,766 402,800,000 358,600,000_______90J5__________-0.08________ 0.07________0.00
Table 4.4: Aggregate variables, totals per year.
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4.6 R esu lts
4.6.1 Production function
Table 4.5 reports the results for the production function estimates using the 
methodology defined above. Because of problems that could arise in the first stage, 
and bias the estimates of due to potential unobserved state variables, I have 
also tried using a fixed effects specification with no overall impact on the results.
The estimated labor and capital coefficients imply constant returns to scale 
while the estimated demand elasticity implies a price-cost margin of 19%. These 
values are at a reasonable level and within the range of parameters found in the 
literature for other industries. To test the method I also report the results using 
a range of specifications. The evidence seem to corroborate some of the findings 
by Bond and Soderbom (2005) according to which, in the presence of adjustment 
costs for the inputs and autocorrelation in productivity, consistent estimation of 
production functions parameters becomes possible by quasi-first differencing and 
using lagged levels of inputs as instruments. The only problem seems to be the 
estimates for demand elasticity.
In order for the firms to be willing to pay a sunk cost for R&D, it must be 
that they expect a higher productivity. To check if the productivity distribution 
for R&D firms stochastically dominates the distribution of productivity for the 
non-R&D firms I plot in Figure 4.8 the two distributions. As we can see, there is 
evidence that R&D firms have better productivity draws. TFP is on average 40% 
higher for R&D firms.
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M (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) W (xi) (xii) (x i i i ) (xiv) (xv) (xvi) (xvii)
M ethodo logy OLS F ixed  Effec ts O lley and P akes L ev insohn  an d  P e tr in B ond  an d  S oderbom
L ab o r C oef 0.80 0.76 0.74 0.70 0.62 0.84 0.65 0.83 0.88 0.58 0.73 0.67 0 .7 5 0.79 0.77 0.88 1.06
C a p ita l C oef 0.27 0.23 0.27 0.22 0.06 0.27 0.07 0.09 0.01 0.25 0.39 0.23 0 .2 3 0.26 0.28 0.23 0.26
P rice  C ost M argin 0.08 - 0.07 - - 0.05 0.23 0.26 - - 0.09 0 .1 9 0.23 0.05 0.03 0.11
R e tu rn s  to  scale 1.07 0.99 1.01 0.93 0.68 1.10 0.72 0.92 0.89 0.83 1.11 0.89 0 .9 9 1.06 1.06 1.11 1.32
T im e dum m ies No Yes No Yes No Yes No No No No Yes No N o No No No No
N otes W (b) (c) (a) (b ) (c) (d) (e)
(a) Im p e rfe c t co m p e titio n , in p u t dem an d  in d e p en d en t on agg reg a te  shocks
(b) Im p e rfe c t co m p e titio n , in p u t dem an d  d ep e n d en t on agg reg a te  shocks
(c) Im p e rfe c t co m p e titio n , in p u t d em and  d ep e n d en t on ag g reg a te  shocks, m u ltic o lin e arity  co rrec tio n  (A ckerberg , Caves and  F razer)
(d) N on-R D  firm s
(e) RD firm s
Table 4.5: Summary table for production function estimates of labor, capital and demand elasticity coefficients using alternative 
methodologies.
CO -
CO -
-
CM _
124 106 8
omegadef
 Omega(RD) -------------Omega(NoRD)
Figure 4.8: TF? distribution (CDF) for R&D and non-R&D firms
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(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
D ep en d en t V ariab le: A gg reg a te  S ta te  ln ( S )
C oef. a.e. Coef. a.e. Coef. a.e. Coef. a.e.
In(St_i) 0 5  0 5  1725 O M  T !33  T34  570.85 598.06
In(St_2) -0.35 0.32
ln ( S t  — i )  0.10 0.23  -34*.94 36.56
In(St_ i)3 0.71 0.74
C o n s ta n t 1.01 1.23  1.76 1.50  27.66 59.81  -3096.74 3260.35
O b se rv a tio n s  11 10 11 11
A d ju sted  R S q uared____ 0.946_______________ 0.9335________________ 0.9474___________________0.9535_____________
M ean l n ( S ) 16.43 
S t. D ev In (S )  0.39
A u to co rre la tio n  fn (S )  0.97_______________________________________________________________________________ ______
N otes: C olum n (i) specifies a lin ear firs t o rd er m arkov process an d  colum n (ii) a  second o rd er M arkov process.
C olum n (iii) and  (iv) p re sen t re su lts  for a second and  th ird  degree po lynom ial.
Table 4.6: Tests on the aggregate state variable.
4.6.2 Transition function 
A ggregate sta te
For the aggregate state, I calculate the mean, variance and autocorrelation and 
use Corollary 2.2 to specify the aggregate state transition. These are estimated 
at: fis  =  16.43, as =  0.39, ps =  0.97.
Alternatively, we might not impose normality and estimate the transition, 
(/(S't+ilS't) directly. In Table 4.6 I report these results for a non-parametric ap­
proximation using a polynomial expansion.
Specification te s t Proposition 2.1 in chapter 2 contains the result that un­
der some assumptions, the resulting equilibrium evolution for the aggregate state 
is Markovian. In this section I test the validity of this result. This is important 
to confirm (or reject) the model’s assumption that allow using the aggregate state 
representation. The problem arises because even if players use Markovian strate­
gies, the resulting equilibrium might not be first order Markovian. If Assumption 
2.1 is violated, the use of one period lagged values of the aggregate variable is 
insufficient and potentially all history could matter leading to a time dependency 
problem. This is an important specification test of the model since the idea that 
the industry state can be summarized by the aggregate state is a crucial result to
88
resolve the ’curse of dimensionality’ problem.
In Table 4 .7 ,1 test the significance of previous lags of the state variable (which 
would constitute a violation of a first order Markovian process). I directly perform 
a test of the following implication of Proposition 2.1 in chapter 2
p(St+1\St ,S t- U ...S0) = p ( S t+1\St)
The results support the first order Markovian process for the industry state. I 
further investigate this by testing whether further moments of the state variables 
(ln(F),£j, ln(i^)) are statistically significant conditional on St . This is actually a 
stronger test. To see this remember that the aggregate state is the payoff relevant 
variable. However, the individual competitors’ states might be informationally 
relevant variables in the complete information model. Therefore testing their 
significance is similar to testing how far the aggregate state model is from the 
complete full information model. I test the following restriction
p(St+1\g(St) ,S t) = p ( S t+1\St)
In Table 4.7 we the results show that the second and third moments of the 
productivity, capital stock and sales distribution are not statistically significant, 
conditional on St,which again confirms the previous result. This gives me confi­
dence in using the aggregate state model.
Productivity
For the individual productivity, I estimate a third order polynomial for lj 
separately for R&D and non R&D firms (equation 4.15) and results are shown in 
Table 4.8. R&D firms are on average 40% more productive and their productivity 
dispersion is also considerably smaller.
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(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
D ep en d en t V ariab le:
_________________ C oef. i .e . Coef. i . e . Coef. i .e . Coef. a.e. Coef. i .e . Coef. i .e . Coef. i .e .  Coef. i.e .
Zn[5] 0.95 0.08 0.90 0.09 0.84 0.09 0.79 0.10 0.68 0.18 0.88 0.01 0.83 0.08 0.69 0.20
s td  ( ln ( Y ) ) - - -0.62 0.59 - - - - - - - - - - -1.77 0.87
s k e w (fn (y )) - - - - -0.02 0.18 - . - - - - - - -0.68 0.28
& td (ln (K )) - - - - - - 0.49 0.4 7 - - - - - - -0.25 0.83
skew (in (/C )) - - - - - - - - -0.15 0.15 - - - - 0.07 0.13
s td  (a;) - - - - - - - - - - -0.58 0.28 - - 0.07 0.26
skew (a/) - - - - - - - . - - - . 0.04 0.05 -0.12 0.10
const 1.0X 1.23 2.64 1.27 2.65 1.51 2.81 1.29 5.14 2.85 2.50 1.06 2.83 1.36 7.46 3.49
O bs. 11 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
R 2 94% 94% 92% 94% 94% 96% 93% 99%
N otes: C o lum n (i) specifies a lin ear firs t o rd er m arkov p rocess and  co lum ns (ii)-(v iii) te s t  th e  significance of fu r th e r  m om en ts  (s ta n d a rd  d ev ia tio n  
an d  skew ness) of th e  d is tr ib u tio n  of log sales ( l n ( Y )), c a p ita l  s tock  (!n (.K )) and  T F P  (u>).
Table 4.7: Further tests on the aggregate state variable.
0 ) (» )  
Nod-RD firms RD firms
Coef. a.e. Coef. a.e.
[wt - l ] 0.72 0.03 0.75 0.09
(“ t - l l 2 0.16 0.01 0.07 0.10
(“ t - l l 3 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.03
c o n s ta n t 0.14 0.03 0.24 0.05
R -squared 67% 80%
O bs. 784 254
F irm s 198 59
S.E . R esid . 0.40 0.26
N ote: R esu lts  for th e  p ro d u c tiv ity  tra n s itio n  using
a 3 rd  degree  po lynom ial
Table 4.8: Transition function for productivity, OLS results. 
Investm ent, R & D  and ex it policies
The final part of the second step involves the estimation of the investment and 
R&D policy functions. These will be at the heart of the third step where it is 
imposed that they represent optimal behavior. I have used different degrees for 
the polynomials (1st, 2nd and 3rd) and opted for a 2nd order polynomial. The 
reason for doing so is because higher order polynomials can create more noise 
in the estimates and this is magnified in the third step as these variables enter 
non-linearly in the minimum distance estimator (Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2007).
The R&D policy function (equation 4.13) was estimated using a probit model 
whereas the investment policy function (equation 4.12) was estimated using OLS. 
For the exit policies due to data limitations, I have adopted a probit model only 
on productivity and aggregate sales.
The results are presented in Table 4.9. The probability of doing R&D is in­
creasing in both productivity and capital stock, meaning that larger and more 
productive firms are more likely to pay the sunk cost probably because they are 
also able to extract a higher benefit from doing R&D. Regarding investment de­
cisions, more productive firms tend to invest more and they are also less likely to 
exit the industry. This is all in line with previous findings.
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(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
D ep. V ar. In vestm en t ED  s ta r t -u p  E x it P ro b it
RD  firm s Non RD  firm s
C oef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e.
I n ( 5 t _ ! ) -0.36 0.27 -0.16 0.20 0.26 0.25 -0.02 0.53
-2.08 1.13 1.20 0.37 0.16 0.06
l n ( K t _ ! ) 2 0.10 0.04 -0.02 0.02 - - - -
[ " t - l l 1.17 0.3  7 0.25 0.10 0.07 0.14 -0.17 0.20
-0.25 0.13 0.17 0.06 - - - -
C o n s ta n t 26.67 8.90 1.90 3.98 -7.90 4-05 -2.07 8.66
R S quared  53% 30% 4% 1%
O b se rv a tio n s  206 832 1038 832 1038
F irm s  51 213 264 213 224
N otes: C o lum ns (i)  and (ii) con ta in  re su lts  for th e  invesm en t OLS re su lts  for th e  non-R D  
and  RD firm s. C o lum n (iii) con ta in s  re su lts  for th e  RD s ta r t -u p  p ro b it 
reg ress ion . F in a lly  colum n (iv) con ta in s  re s u lts  for th e  e x it p ro b it reg ression .
Table 4.9: Estimated policy functions.
4.6.3 Main results
In the third step I use the minimum distance estimator outlined above to re­
cover the linear and quadratic investment cost, R&D sunk cost and exit value, 
reported in Table 4.10. Standard errors were estimated using the bootstrap. As
mentioned above, the bootstrapped standard errors are an upper bound to the true
standard errors because they also incorporate simulation error which is present 
because of computational constraints. I have introduced per period R&D expen­
ditures for firms who decide to do R&D at 1% of their sales level. This is a fixed
cost component for any firm who choose to do R&D and has to be paid every
period to keep the "R&D lab" operating. As explained above, this is consistent 
with some models where R&D is optimally chosen as a fixed proportion of total 
sales (e.g. Klette and Kortum, 2004).
The values are estimated with the expected signs. Specially, investment has 
positive quadratic adjustment costs. The exit value is positive and estimated at 
around 534,000 euros which is slightly higher then the average capital stock of 
exiting firms (420,684 EUR). Finally for the parameter we are interested in, the 
R&D sunk costs are estimated at about 2.6 million euros which is 1.7 times the
average firm level sales in the industry and 87% the average sales of an R&D firm.
As explained above, bias in the policy function estimates will translate non-
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Ml m2 A e
Coefs -0.46 5.77 2,598,000 -534,000
s.e. 1.61 7.17 1,020,524 1,020,162
N otes: E s tim a te s  for th e  dynam ic  p a ra m e te rs  and 
b o o ts tra p e d  s ta n d a rd  erro rs . T hese  inc lude 
s im u la tion  erro r and  are an u p p e r  b o u n d  on tru e  ones.
Table 4.10: Investment cost, RD sunk cost and exit value.
linearly in the dynamic parameter estimates. I have tried alternative specifications 
for the policy functions using different degrees for the polynomials. The estimated 
dynamic parameters are relatively robust to these alternative polynomials. One is­
sue not addressed here and currently under research is the existence of unobserved 
state variables. This is a significant problem which might bias the estimates but 
the literature with methods for properly addressing it is still at an early stage.
4.7 Counterfactual experim ents
In this section I perform a policy experiment where the sunk cost of R&D is 
exogenously decreased by 25% and access the impact of this change in industry 
R&D, productivity and investment. The simplest example of such a policy would 
be a direct R&D start-up subsidy but could be more broad like the creation of 
public research agency dedicated to advise firms during R&D start-ups or the 
supply of training to workers with very specific skills required to do R&D. These 
are probably more effective because some of the sunk costs might be duplication 
costs and a research agency would explore the economies of scale.
To achieve this I now need to solve the model. Particularly I have to find 
the new equilibrium industry evolution, q(St+i\St). This requires defining entry 
costs and specifying the productivity distribution for entrants. I match these to 
the actual mean and variance for the productivity of entrants in my dataset and 
calibrate an entry value to get a consistent equilibrium average number of firms 
in the industry.
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X =  2, 598, OOP_______ X =  1 ,9 4 8 ,5 0 0 _______________________________change
M arket size 4,228,255 6,514,233 43%
Num ber o f firm s 267 227 -15%
% o f R D  firm s 16% 33% 16%
Average P roductivity 2.92 3.24 11%
Average C apital S tock 77,637 92,865 18% .
E n try  Rate 4% 5% 1%
E xit Rate 4% 5% 1%
N otes: S im u la ted  re su lts  for th e  im p ac t on m a rk e t s tru c tu re  of a  25% red u c tio n in RD sunk  costs
Table 4.11: Counterfactual results for a 25 percent reduction in sunk costs of RD.
After setting these I use the algorithm in Figure 2.1 to calculate the equilib­
rium for the model using the estimated structural parameters. Notice that these 
experiments could not be performed without using the aggregate state instead of 
the full industry state model. To solve the model in the complete information 
case with 300 firms in the market would be computationally impossible, but it is 
feasible and relatively fast in the "aggregate state" case.7
Results are presented in Table 4.11. The first point to notice is the decrease 
in the equilibrium number of firms. This happens because with lower sunk costs 
of R&D, more firms perform R&D and since R&D firms are larger, the average 
firm size increases and so the entry condition is met with less firms in the market. 
Secondly, there is an increase in the percentage of firms performing R&D, which 
doubles. This increase in the number of R&D firms translates into an increase in 
aggregate R&D, average productivity of 11% and average capital stock of 18%.
4.8 Final com m ents
In this chapter I have estimated the sunk costs of R&D for the Portuguese 
Moulds Industry using a model which is computationally tractable and possible 
to implement empirically with the most common firm level datasets. The model 
both avoids the ’curse of dimensionality’ and the existence of unobserved firms in 
the data.
7Solving the model takes about 100 minutes of computer time on a 2.0 Ghz Pentium Core2 
Duo with 2GB Memory RAM.
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The idea I explored was to summarize the industry state into the payoff rel­
evant aggregate state by introducing incomplete information in the model. As 
explained in chapter 2, this implicitly imposes more structure in terms of strategic 
interactions, specifically the firms react symmetrically to all its competitors. This 
is not restrictive for the moulds manufacturing industry because each firm spe­
cializes in a particular product, they do not observe what their competitors offer, 
firms produce almost per piece and prices are contract specific. This means that 
demand can be reasonably well approximated with a constant demand elasticity 
framework.
Finally I apply this setup to recover the sunk cost of R&D for the Portuguese 
moulds industry. I have estimated these to be about 2.6 million euros (or 1.7 
times the average yearly firm sales level). The magnitude of the sunk costs suggest 
that policies cannot disregard the discreteness of the R&D decision. Particularly, 
policies targeted at reducing the sunk costs and increasing R&D start-ups will be 
effective at increasing industry productivity.
I have not explored two ways of making alternative use of the simplification 
introduced by the aggregate state model. First, since given the beliefs about the 
aggregate state evolution, the problem can be almost represented as a single agent 
one, I can apply the Nested Fixed Point Algorithm as developed in Rust (1987). 
The disadvantage is that the value function has to be solved for each parameter 
value, 6 greatly increasing computational time.
Second, the existence of serially correlated unobserved variables might bias the 
second step estimates. This bias can be magnified in the third step because of 
the nonlinear relationship between the second and third step parameters. Aguir- 
regabiria and Mira (2007) propose a method to deal with this which makes use 
of the equilibrium conditions. I have not explored the fact that since my model 
avoids the curse of dimensionality, I can recalculate the equilibrium for a given
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parameter set and use the equilibrium conditions in a similar way. A future line 
of research is to make use of these alternatives to increase the efficiency of the 
estimator.
4.A  A ppendix
4.A.1 Demand derivation
Assuming individuals have the following utility
\  v - i
2 2 = 1
With [/(.) differentiable and quasi-concave and Z  represents aggregate industry 
shifters.
Setting up the Lagrangian for i =  1, N  ( Q i ^ ' j  =  Q)
Take the First Order Conditions
u r 1 IE Q*' or1 = p'w  (416)
Rearranging
22= 2 .
■n
2 2 = 1  ‘
^ t / r 1 * J J  =  o .
( w - ' U i Q * * )  Q~1/v =  Pi
Using the budget constraint Y  =  X] PiQi and (4.16) from above
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Y = ^ - i u r  (E^JEft
Using (4.17) from above and replacing for Qi
2 - 1
V (4.17)
? =  ( e  Y , p i (n~l)
Finally replacing back in the first order condition and rearranging, demand is
Qi =
Y
E P i
- 7 7
4.A.2 Derivation of the reduced form profit function
Since uji and Ki  are fixed factors, the only adjustable factor is labor: 7r =  
P[Q(Li)]Q(Li) — wLi  where w  is the wage rate. Using equations 4.3 and 4.2 the 
first order conditions are
? -± a P  [Qih)] ®  =  w
Li
(4.18)
Rewriting we get
{rj ~  l)o;
TJW
l / [ ? 7 - a ( 7 7 - l ) ]
(4.19)
Replacing back in the production function (4.3)
Q1 =  UiLfKf = (uiKtA  ( ( v -  !)<*
rjw
~  \  i h t7/[t7- q (t 7- 1)]
(4.20)
Prices can be written from the Demand Function (4.2)
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—77(1—a )
TJW P )
- 1 / ( 7 7 - 0 ( 7 7 - 1 ) ]
(4.21)
Finally sales axe
PiQi =
The price index is
TJW
(T 7 - I )
l/fa-afa-l)]
(4.22)
p = ( £ f r (’ - i); p - 1
From (4.21) above we can express this as
(jJi(p,r r 1 =
So that the price index is
— (1—a)' 1 / ( 7 7 - 0 ( 7 7 - ! ) ]
(4.23)
(4.24)
P  = ( r ^ Y y - l l - o )
TJW
-1
£['UiK
(4.25)
Using this in the equation for profit
# ( w i , K i , S;rj ,(3) =  P ( Q i ) Q i  -  w L t
r j - a { r j -  1)
TJW
Y
1 / ( 7 7 - 0 ( 7 7 - 1 ) ]
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Writing 7  =  (77 — 1 )/(r] — <2(77 — 1))
# [UttK t,S;r,,fi) =  - ( ^ — L
7 V 7?
w
(77 -  l)a
— Q7
y i/fo -i) L i K ? p y  (4.26)
or
7
Using the expression for P,  (4.25) we finally get the period returns
1  /  7 7  1 \
* K  K it S; 17, /?) =  -  ( 2 -----  y - ^ -----'  (4.28)
I K  n J
4.A.3 D ata and sample construction
I have collected data for the aggregate variables from the Portuguese National 
Statistics Office (INE), together with data on industry price deflators (from IAP- 
MEI, 2006). I have merged these aggregate variables with the sample for the 5 
digit NACE code industry 29563 (Moulds Industry). The capital stock was calcu­
lated using the perpetual inventory formula and a depreciation rate of 8 %. Value 
added was constructed as total sales subtracted from materials and services. Both 
aggregate and individual sales and value added were deflated with the industry 
price deflator.
In 11 observations the number of workers reported was zero which occurs 
mostly in the year the firms enter or exit the industry. Since the owner of the 
firm is never reported as a worker I add one to all firms with zero reported work­
ers. The results are robust to dropping these observations.
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I identified 9 holes in the sample (firms that interrupt reporting for 1 or more 
consecutive years). In these cases either the earlier or later periods are dropped, 
minimizing the total number of observations lost.
Entry and exit are difficult to identify since it is not compulsory for firms to 
report to the central bank. However, the dataset has information on the founding 
year and current firm "status" (i.e. active, bankrupt, merged, etc). Using this 
information I identify 48 actual entries and 7 exits.
I have winsorized at 1% (0.5% on each tail) the variables for In (K),  I, In (Materials), 
ln(Value Added), value added growth, sales growth.
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Chapter 5
Identifying Financial Constraints 
in a Dynamic Structural M odel of 
R&D and Investment: The US 
Iron and Steel Industry
5.1 Introduction
The question of the role of financial constraints for investment in general and 
innovation in particular is one of the most debated issues in empirical economics. 
It is obviously important as investment and innovation are critical for economic 
growth, so financial market failures can have first order effects on welfare and 
policies to address growth will depend on whether one thinks financial constraints 
are a problem or not (e.g. Banerjee, 2004; Banerjee and Duflo, 2008).
Given this interest, the current state of the empirical literature is rather dis­
appointing (see Bond and Van Reenen, 2008 for a survey). Our main structural 
econometric models of investment assume away financial constraints even though
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there is a general feeling that they are important1. Unfortunately, empirical strate­
gies to test for the presence and magnitude of financial constraints have floundered 
for at least two reasons. First, we do not have a good structural econometric model 
of investment decisions in the presence of financial constraints. Second, the key 
tests for the presence of financial constraints is the significance of a measure of 
cash flow on investment, but the cash flow measure could signal future profitable 
investment opportunities rather than the “deep pockets” of firms.
This chapter seeks to address these problems by exploiting recent methodolog­
ical advances in estimating dynamic structural models through numerical simula­
tion (e.g. Bajari, Benkard and Levin, 2007; Santos, 2008; Bloom, 2008). We do 
this by building an explicit structural model of investment and R&D in a world 
with costs of external finance and estimating this on a panel of firms from the U.S. 
steel industry. We uncover evidence of significant financial constraints (a premium 
of 35 cents on the dollar) and quantitatively large and important sunk costs of 
R&D (an estimated sunk cost of $194m for “building an R&D lab”).
The classic way to examine financial constraints is to include some measure 
of cash flow in an investment equation, generally allowing for some ex ante sep­
aration of the sample into regimes where we think financial constraints may be 
more important (e.g. Fazzari, Hubbard and Peterson, 1988). Much criticism has 
been levelled at this approach because of the ambiguity of the interpretation of 
the larger coefficient on cash flows in the allegedly financially constrained regime 
(e.g. younger firms, smaller firms, those with worse bond ratings, etc.) given 
that the investment models tend to be somewhat ad hoc and cash flow is usu­
ally significant in both regimes (e.g. Kaplan and Zingales, 1997). An alternative 
approach is to estimate a structural model of investment and then include cash 
flow as a specification test. Bond and Meghir (1994) estimate an Euler equation
1 There are many theoretical models of financial constraints, of course, but these have not 
proven to be empirically tractable.
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and Hayashi (1982) a Q-equation. Both found evidence that cash flow was sig­
nificant (at least for some sub-groups). However, the performance of the Euler 
equation and Q model for investment is questionable, not least because of the 
assumption that adjustment costs are convex. There is much recent evidence of 
non-convexities due to partial irreversibilities (e.g. Bloom, Bond and Van Reenen,
2008). Additionally, stock market based measures of Q are subject to large mea­
surement errors due to bubbles and the like (e.g. Bond and Cummins, 1999). If 
these models are incorrectly specified, the significance of cash flow may still be 
reflecting misspecification rather than positive evidence of financing constraints.
The approach we take here starts with a structural model that allows for the 
presence of financing constraints where raising finance from external sources is 
more expensive than from internal funds. We then estimate the parameters of 
this model, which includes the null that the cost of external finance may be equal 
to that of internal finance.
The information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders that lie at the 
heart of the financing problem are likely to affect investment in innovation more 
than other forms of investment. Several papers have investigated this. For exam­
ple, Bond, Harhoff and Van Reenen (2008) argue that these financing constraints 
are most likely to bind for firms when they choose to start up an R&D lab. This 
is because there is a substantial sunk cost involved in starting an R&D program 
(e.g. Sutton, 1998) and this irrecoverable cost might be the hardest to convince 
external investors to cover (e.g. there is no collateral to reclaim if the project fails). 
In chapter 2 I have examined a dynamic structural model with sunk R&D costs 
and investment in a world with perfect financial markets. This chapter builds 
on this framework where we add financial frictions. We find that this addition 
considerably enriches the predictions of the model in terms of productivity and 
entry dynamics.
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The application of the chapter is to the US iron and steel industry. We believe 
that it is useful to focus on a particular sector where we can more credibly outline 
the main industrial features 'rather than pooling across a large number of very 
heterogenous sectors - this by itself should reduce some of the potential sources 
of endogeneity from unobserved shocks that plague the literature. The sector has 
many attractive features from our perspective. First there has been substantial 
technical change (such as the mini-mill revolution of the 1980s). Second, there 
is a mixture of firms who have R&D labs and those who do not (and some who 
switch status in our 35 year sample). This is a feature of many industries that has 
puzzled some writers, but emerges naturally as an equilibrium phenomenon in a 
world of firm heterogeneity in productivity and cash flow shocks.
Our chapter relates to many others (see the next section for a brief litera­
ture review). First, the structural model of financial constraints we use builds on 
Gomes (2001) approach but extends it to allow for R&D and imperfect competi­
tion. Furthermore, our implementation is on micro data rather than macro data. 
Second, we work with models in the spirit of heterogeneous firm models of Hopen- 
hayn (1992), Ericson and Pakes (1995) or Melitz (2003) but with a firm-level IO 
orientation.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 5.2 offers a brief overview 
of the literature and Section 5.3 gives an overview of the industry. Section 5.4 
outlines the model, Section 5.5 the estimation strategy and section 5.6 provides a 
brief description of the data. Section 5.7 and 5.8 detail the results and robustness 
tests and finally Section 5.9 concludes. Details are left to Appendices.
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5.2 Literature review
The literature on credit constraints has in the past presented strong economet­
ric evidence of an important role for cash flows in predicting investment decisions.2 
Simulation methods of fully structural models emphasize that Tobin’s Q should in­
corporate all information needed regarding investment profitability and cash flow 
significance should not be taken as a signal of constraints but either misspecifica- 
tion or measurement error (Gomes, 2001). However, these results crucially depend 
on the assumption that there are no unanticipated temporary shocks to cash flow 
and if one could observe permanent and temporary shocks to cash flow, we would 
be able to separately identify the effect of cash flows on profitability (permanent) 
and the effect of cash flows on relaxing financial constraints (temporary).
Below, we present some evidence that when cash flows are affected by tem­
porary shocks, cash flow is still a significant variable for credit constrained firms, 
even after controlling for investment opportunities. Since the central question is 
how can we separately identify investment opportunities and financial constraints 
we aim at shedding some light on this. We adopt a structural estimation approach 
and carefully provide an explanation for what drives identification of the relevant 
parameters. There has been some recent work on structural estimation of finan­
cial constraints (Schulden, 2008; Hennessy and Whited, 2007) but this has mostly 
been done in a single agent context and ignores the impacts of financial constraints 
on industry equilibrium and market structure.
5.2.1 Investment and financial constraints
Financial frictions have for a long time been regarded as one potential barrier 
to capital accumulation and growth, and a potential impairment to competition.
2 See Bond and Van Reenen (2008) for a survey.
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The correct assessment of their existence (or not) therefore seems to be of utmost 
importance for several branches of economics. The issue is really an empirical 
rather than theoretical problem and most results seem to indicate a significance 
importance for credit constraints. These results do not go without problems and 
have been object of several criticisms which we hope to address.
Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) pioneered the empirical research on 
investment and credit constraints by investigating the validity of the Modigliani- 
Miller Theorem due to the effects of tax treatments, asymmetric information and 
agency costs of external and internal finance. Using various models, they argue 
that cash flow should not be a relevant explanatory variable once you control for 
investment opportunities (e.g. Tobin’s Q). This well known "excess sensitivity" 
could then be taken as a signal of credit constraints.
The failure of Tobin’s Q framework has raised doubts about the cash flow 
results on the grounds that the basic framework is misspecified and cash flows 
are good predictors for future profitability that do not necessarily reflect credit 
constraints. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) criticize the sample splitting procedure 
normally used by showing that higher cash flow coefficients are not necessarily 
a signal of bigger credit problems. Cooper and Haltiwanger’s (2006) criticisms, 
along the same fines, are based on the fact that the measurement error introduced 
by the use of average Q instead of marginal Q would make conclusions hard to 
establish. Gomes (2001) for example, shows that Tobin’s Q already reflects credit 
constraints so that additional variables should only be relevant if they capture 
nonlinearities of Q or measurement error problems.
The poor performance of the basic Tobin’s Q framework has driven the in­
vestment literature to follow alternative paths to solve the misspecification and 
measurement error problems. The first approach was to build a better Q measure.
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Abel and Blanchard (1986)3 build it using a VAR of discount rates and average 
productivity of capital to proxy for marginal profit. They find that marginal Q 
variation is mainly driven by discount rate volatility but it is the profitability that 
better explains investment variation. Bond and Cummins (1999) suggest using an­
alysts forecast as a proxy for marginal Q and find that with this methodology cash 
flow is no longer significant and the size of adjustment costs is more reasonably 
estimated.4
The second approach to deal with the Q problem was taken by relaxing the 
assumptions on the cost function, allowing for fixed costs, irreversibilities and non­
convexities. Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) introduce imperfect competition in a 
model with non-convexities and irreversibilities. They point that i) non convexities 
and irreversibilities play a central role in the investment process and; ii) non­
convexities are less important at the aggregate level. In the same fine of research 
Dixit and Pindyck’s option theory is derived in the case of irreversibilities that 
create an option value for investment delay. Naive Net Present Value formulations 
forget to take into account the existence of options arising from reversibility and 
expandability. Firms can disinvest, but resale price may be lower and can continue 
to invest later but acquisition price may be higher. When future returns are 
uncertain, these features yield two options: a put option for installed capital and 
a call option for opportunity to invest. Generally, the option to expand reduces the 
incentive to invest, while the option to disinvest raises it. Both the option value 
approach and the Q-theory approach will correctly characterize optimal behavior, 
yet each offers its own set of distinctive insights about the investment decision.
Allowing for a different specification of the profit function (Abel and Eberly 
(2002)) show that average Q and marginal Q are not the same in a model with
3 Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) use the same approach
4The validity of using the coefficient in Q as the size of adjustment costs depends very strongly 
on the parametric assumption of the cost function.
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monopoly power and no credit constraints where cash flows are relevant because 
they help to predict non-observables or poorly measured variables like growth rates 
or depreciation. It is also shown that the effect of cash flows should be stronger for 
small, fast growing or volatile firms (since they should have higher depreciation 
rates) even though there are no credit constraints.
Finally Bloom, Bond and Van Reenen (2008) show how investment reacts at 
the firm level in a model where there is lumpiness and inaction at the single capital 
single plant level. They try to explain how the investment rate at the firm level 
will react to uncertainty and show that an increase in demand uncertainty will 
move the upper (investment) threshold up and the lower (disinvestment) threshold 
down such that it reduces reaction to shocks and increases the region of inaction. 
Basically this means that higher uncertainty increases the value of the options and 
so it increases the value of waiting.
5.2.2 R&D and financial constraints
Authors since Schumpeter (1942) have pointed to difficulties in financing R&D 
that can lead to underinvestment (e.g. Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1962). The nature 
of R&D (intangible assets, mostly constituted by wages, high uncertainty) makes 
it very difficult for firms to offer good collateral and for lenders to "control" the 
investment. Also, firms might not want to reveal confidential information to the 
lenders as this might result in leakages of secret information to rival competitors.
Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) argue that firm’s R&D expenditure in high 
technology sectors should react to permanent cash flow movements but not to 
transitory ones. Since costs are mainly wages paid to highly qualified people, 
hiring and firing costs are very high, R&D expenditures tend to be smooth and 
highly autocorrelated.
Hall (2002) and Aghion et al. (2004) study the problem of R&D financing
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and present evidence that R&D performers have a different financing structure. 
Firms choice of financial structure may be different for R&D performers due to 
bankruptcy costs (intangibility of R&D), greater degree of asymmetric information 
or control rights (more attractive investment opportunities for more innovative 
firms). Aghion et al. (2004) find that use of debt is higher for R&D performers 
but decreases with R&D intensity and, use of equity is higher for performers and 
increases with R&D intensity.
We analyze the impact of financial constraints on the decision to start R&D. 
Particularly we focus on the effect of internal availability of funds on the R&D 
start-up decision. We model the outcome of R&D, innovations, as a stochastic 
increase in productivity (TFP) which could incorporate both process and product 
innovations.5 The firm faces a discrete decision in that first decides on whether or 
not to start an R&D project and after that it sets its optimal R&D expenditure 
levels. We will abstract from this second decision for simplicity. The reason why 
we can separate the (binary) decision to start the R&D project from the continuous 
R&D amounts to set is because data suggests that the R&D to sales ratio is highly 
autocorrelated. In a sense we assume that firms set the R&D to sales ratio at an 
optimal level like in Klette and Kortum (2004).
5.3 T he U .S. iron and steel industry
We use data for the US Iron and Steel Mills industry (NAICS 331111) for the 
period 1970-2005.6 The Steel industry was one of the engines of growth for the 
United States during the 1950’s and is still considered as a “strategic” sector by
5 The productivity index can be shown to be a mixture of both quality and costs. These 
cannot be easily disentagled unless price data is available.
6 For a detailed description of the data see the Data Appendix.
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Figure 5.1: US Steel production, imports and exports in million tons: 1935-2006 
(source: US Geological Survey)
the US government.7 However, the sector suffered substantial turmoil over the 
last three decades. In the 1980’s the industry went through a severe crisis leading 
to falls in production (Figure 5.1) with two industry leaders - U.S. Steel and 
the LTV Corporation - undergoing severe problems in 1986. Since the industry
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Figure 5.2: US Price of Steel in dollars per ton: 1935-2005 (source: US Geological 
Survey)
in the mid 1980’s which allowed an increase in competitiveness. One of the main 
drivers of this change was the entry of the so-called mini-mills (or electric arc 
furnaces) as opposed to the traditional integrated producers (open hearth or basic 
oxygen furnaces). Mini-mills produce lower quality steel from scrap metal while 
the integrated producers can use pig iron and supply high quality steel. There was 
also a recent "import crisis" event in 1998, where several foreign countries were 
accused of dumping steel prices and import penetration reached a peak maximum 
of 30%. This was related to the Asian financial crisis and the drastic decline in 
demand for steel in the region which resulted in a world overcapacity problem.
Summarizing, there is evidence that the industry is very reactive to the business 
cycle and demand for steel from main clients (e.g. automotive sector) . The 
high capital investment necessary for production requires a minimum production 
capacity. This implies that it is hard to reduce capacity when demand is low and 
the result is the strong cyclicality observed with record losses during crisis and 
high profits in good times. The two types of firm organization and the success of 
the mini-mills vs integrated producers is also related with their higher flexibility
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Figure 5.3: Average firm level profits and investment rate per year (COMPUSTAT 
data): 1970-2005.
in terms of costs and production and lower investment requirements (capital costs 
for the integrated mills are normally much higher then for mini-mills). However, 
since the mini-mills use scrap metal and cannot produce the highest quality steel, 
the integrated producers are still able to partly survive the competition. We try
used by firms as a strategic variable compared to other industries like Biotech or 
Semiconductors. This is important because it allows us to abstract away from all 
different sorts of motives behind the R&D decisions typical of high tech industries 
and focus mainly on sunk costs and financial constraints.
A feature of the industry is that average firm profits and the investment rate 
are highly correlated. Since current profits could potentially be a signal of future 
profitability as well as an indicator of the internal availability of funds, we cannot 
immediately identify whether firms in the Steel industry are credit constrained. 
But since this industry is capital intensive, the existence of financial frictions that 
prevent firms from investing might be a large source of inefficient capital allocation.
5.4 T he M odel
We develop a model in which firms invest in physical capital and decide on 
whether or not to set up an R&D lab. We allow R&D into the model because of its 
importance for innovation and growth. Production is done with a Cobb-Douglas 
technology and goods are sold in the market in a monopolistically competitive 
framework. If firms do not have sufficient funds to finance investment internally 
(via cash flow), they have to incur a financial cost which is increasing in the 
total amount borrowed. The specification of a dynamic equilibrium framework is 
important due to the fact that investment is very sensitive to the business cycle. 
This is the reason why we adopt a similar framework to the one in chapter 4 
where industry competition is summarized by the aggregate state. This allows 
us to estimate an otherwise intractable model.8 We build and expand on that 
framework by introducing the possibility of higher costs for external funds (debt 
or equity). We model them by adding a cost which depends on whether the firm
8 See chapter 2 for a discussion of the advantages and disadvantes of using the aggregate state 
model.
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has sufficient internal funds to finance its investment or not.
We note here that the model is restrictive in several dimensions. First, we 
do not investigate the firms’ optimal financing structure but simply assume that 
external funds are more costly then internal funds. This is because we are mostly 
interested in the magnitude (if any) of the costs of external financing. Second, 
R&D is modelled as a single sunk cost ( “building an R&D lab”) rather than a 
continuous decision of how much R&D to spend each period. We discuss how 
this assumption can be relaxed, but regard it as a reasonable first step. Bloom, 
Harhoff and Van Reenen (2008) argue that financial constraints may be particu­
larly important at the point when firms decide whether to set up an R&D lab. The 
theory literature also‘focuses on the sunk cost nature of R&D (e.g. Sutton, 1991 
and 1998). Third, we have a simple imperfect competition model in the product 
market whereas we could potentially enrich the menu of strategic interactions.
5.4.1 State and action space
The state space su for firm i at time t  is represented by four variables: Physical 
capital (K ), productivity (a;), R&D status (R, where R =  1 denotes that the firm 
has built the R&D lab and R =  0 otherwise) and operating status (x, where x  =  1 
denotes that the firm has decided to continue operations and x  =  0 denotes that 
it is not operating).
Sit = (Rit j ^iti Riti Xit)
where u it G fl, a compact set on the real number line and K it G £, a compact 
set bounded below by 0. For the discrete decisions, Ra G {0,1 },Xu  € {0> 1}-
There are also stochastic shocks (privately observed by the firm and unobserved 
by the econometrician) including shocks to investment ip\t , to the sunk cost of
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R&D (p ,^ and the scrap value (pft . The vector of payoff shocks (pit — ((pjt , tpft) 
are independent and identically distributed standard normal random variables.
After entering the industry, firms can invest in physical capital, pay a sunk cost 
and engage in R&D and finally decide on exiting from the industry. We denote 
the action space as a, where a superscript denotes either a continuous decision (c) 
such as investment levels or a discrete decision (d) such as starting an R&D lab 
or exiting the industry.
a it — ip'it') a it) ~  {Jity Rit+\-> Xit+l)
Investment, In € 3 can be any non-negative number. We do not allow for 
disinvestment for simplicity reasons. They could be added to the framework and 
estimated in a straightforward way but we think in our data it would be difficult 
to identify them because there are no significant disinvestment observations (for 
example, less then 30 observations in the our sample reported a disinvestment of 
more then 5% of total capital).
This generates a law of motion for the state variables that depends on the 
previous state space and actions with density function
p{.Sit+l\Sity i^t)
As will be discussed below, this law of motion will be stochastic for productivity 
and deterministic for all other state variables.
5.4.2 The aggregate state model
There is a set of assumptions explained in chapter 2 that allow the model to 
be represented by the aggregate state model. The main advantage of this is that 
it allows to break the ’curse of dimensionality’. The players in the industry are
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assumed to use Markovian strategies, individual states are private information 
and players observe own states and the aggregate state, which is also the payoff 
relevant state (e.g. the average price in the monopolistic competition framework, 
as explained below).
The main advantage is that instead of solving the full industry state transition, 
i.e. Pr(s*+i|sf) where st is the industry state vector st =  (sit , S2t, —» $Nt) one only 
needs to solve the aggregate state transition q(St+i\St) where St is the aggregate 
state variable. This results in solving a dynamic problem with a smaller dimen­
sionality then the original problem.9 This implicitly imposes more structure in 
the type of strategic interactions since firms now react to the ’average’ competitor 
(i.e., ceteris paribus, firm A’s reaction to a market structure where both competi­
tors B and C are very similar will be the same as when B is very large and C is 
very small).
5.4.3 Equilibrium
The equilibrium concept is Markov Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in the sense 
of Maskin and Tirole (1988, 2001). Since we restrict to Markovian pure strategies 
where the firm can take actions an G A (sit, St , (pit) the problem can be represented 
as:
V (siu Su (pit\q) =  sup h{siu Su cpit, ait, Vit\ q)
da
where
9To better understand the ” curse of dimensionality’ problem, consider a model with several 
state variables per firm and/or large numbers of firms. Equilibria and policy rules are then 
computationally intractable since the size of the problem grows exponentially. For example, let 
s be the industry state (i.e. define sn the state vector of firm i at time t, then the industry state 
at time t is st = (su, ...sm)), finding the industry state transition, g(st+i|s t), for an industry 
with 50 firms and 2 binary state variables would mean calculating a 450 x 450 transition matrix. 
If one assumes the typical anonymity and symmetry (Pakes and McGuire, 2001) the problem 
will be greatly reduced but still intractable (502 x 502).
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h^ Siti St, <Pit,Q>itiViti O) (5*1)
=  n ( s i t , S t , a i t )  +  <Pit(ait) +  p E { V ( s i t + i , S t + i ) \ s i t , S t , a i t ' ,q}  ( 5 . 2 )
where p is the discount factor and q(.) are equilibrium beliefs about aggre­
gate state evolution. The sit and ait have been defined above and the expec­
tation E[.\sitj St , au\ q] is taken over p(ujit+\\xu =  0)q(St+i\St) if Xu =  0 and 
p(ujit+1\ujit, Rit)q(St+i\St) if Xu =  1- Notice that is the equifibrium
transition probability for the aggregate state. So the firms decide on next period’s 
capital investment, whether to start up an R&D lab, and next period’s operating 
status. Firms optimally choose their entry, exit, R&D and investment given the 
knowledge about the evolution of the industry q(St+i\St).
The value function depends on whether the firm is an incumbent {xu — 1) or 
the firm is a potential entrant (xu — 0)* For incumbents, the value function is 
the sum of current returns and the expected continuation value which depends on 
current individual state (Su), current industry state (St) and actions taken (an). 
For the potential entrant the value function is either zero if it chooses to remain 
outside (Xu+i ~  0) or the sum °f the entry cost with the continuation value which 
depends on the aggregate industry state (St) and the entry state distribution 
(p(wit+llXit =  o)).
Definition 2 A collection of Markovian strategies and beliefs (a, q()) constitute 
a Markov perfect equilibrium if:
(i) Conditional on beliefs about industry evolution (q) firm s’ strategies (ait =  
o*(su, St ,(pit',q) maximize the value function V(su, St ,(pit',q)-
(a) The industry transition (q*(St+i\St ',cr*(sit , St \q)) resulting from optimal be­
havior (a*t) defined above is consistent with beliefs q(St+\\St)
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The solution to the dynamic programming problem conditional on q is the 
optimal strategy cr*(.|g) and a solution exists, under Blackwell’s regularity condi­
tions. These strategies will then characterize the industry conditional distribution 
q(St+i\St; cr*) and the equilibrium is the fixed point to a mapping from the beliefs 
used to obtain the strategies into this industry state transition
r(,q)(SH.1\St) =  tf(SM \St;&‘(.\q))
where firm’s follow optimal strategies <r*(.). An equilibrium exists when there 
is a fixed point to the mapping T (q) : O. —> Q.
5.4.4 Parametrization
Per period returns are a primitive of the model which we specify as ttu. St is the 
aggregate industry state (such as the industry price index), £it is an independent 
and identically distributed random transitory cash flow shock and (pit is a vector 
of other stochastic shocks including price shocks to investment (pjt , to the sunk 
cost of R&D cpx, and the scrap value ipft (if the firm exits the market). The vector 
of payoff shocks (pit =  ipft) are independent and identically distributed
standard normal random random variables.
We first define the demand and production functions and then, assuming 
Bertrand pricing, we solve for the reduced form period returns. The period return 
function satisfies Rust’s (1987) conditional independence and additive separability 
assumptions
7T(-Sit, S t , ditj <Pit) — Tr(Sit) S t,  flit, £^) C
118
Dem and
We use the representative consumer Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition 
framework 10. There are Nt available varieties each supplied by a different firm 
so there are Nt firms in the market and N  — Nt potential entrants. Consumers 
choose quantities of each variety Qi to consume and pay Pi with the following 
preferences:
where U(.) is differentiable and quasi-concave and Z  represents an aggregate 
industry utility shifter. Under these conditions the aggregate price index is
(Nt \  - ?=T (5-3)
and the firm’s demand is [see Appendix 4.A.1]
Qu =  YtP r lpr"  (5-4)
Where ( ^ )  =  - is total industry deflated revenues.
Production function
The production technology is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas where L is labor 
input:
Q,t =  e ^ L Z K i  (5.5)
Since gross flow profits are n =  [P(Qit)Qit — wLit] £it iw  is the wage rate), so 
maximizing out for labor, this becomes:
10 The model also works with other demand structures. A monopolistic competition-framework
is well adjusted for the cases when we do not observe firm level prices. More complex demand
structures can be used when individual price data is available.
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1 /  _ i \
K u, Sf, r,,P) =  - [  —  ) Yt- ± - r — ^ { it
7 7  7 J E , b * * £ ]
(5.6)
where 7  =  {rj—l)/{r)—a{rj—l)). Notice that since in the short run, productivity 
and physical capital are fixed, the only way to adjust production is through labor 
which is assumed to be perfectly flexible. We log-linearize this equation and 
estimate
In 7fit =  a 0 +  oli (jjit +  a 2 In K it +  a 3 In St +  In £it (5.7)
where St =  Yt/Pt . Capital accumulation follows the perpetual inventory 
method depreciating at rate 6:
Kit+ 1 =  (1 — S') Kit +  ht
Productivity and R&D
We assume that productivity evolves stochastically with a different distribution 
for R&D performing and non-R&D performing firms. Firms who have built an 
R&D lab draw a productivity distribution that stochastically dominates that (in 
a first-order sense) of non-R&D firms. In general, product and process innovation 
are difficult to disentangle from each other unless one has firm level price data 
(e.g. Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson, 2008). Since in our data we do not have 
price data we consider them to be indistinguishable in the model and restrict the 
analysis to the effect on productivity, u. The model can however be extended to 
allow for quality in the demand specification (see Melitz, 2000). This distinction 
would be important to model other type of phenomena like dynamic pricing, where 
the effects of product and process innovation would be qualitatively different.
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This ‘internal’ source of uncertainty distinguishes R&D investment from other 
firm’s decisions like capital investment, labor hiring, entry and exit which have 
deterministic outcomes and where the only source of uncertainty is ‘external’ to 
the company (e.g. due to the environment, to competition, to demand, etc.). 
This distinction is important since the stochastic R&D outcome will determine 
(together with entry and exit) the stochastic nature of the equilibrium.
We assume that productivity follows a controled Markov process.
Wit+i = E(ujit+i\ujit, Rit) + Vit
where Vu is independently and identically distributed across firms and time. 
C ost functions
Investm ent cost Investment costs have a quadratic component (Hayashi 
1982) and total irreversibility (no disinvestment). We assume that investment 
costs (CK (It , K it_i)) take the following form:
C K{Iu K a. i )  =
I?
A  it- 1
+  v{tIit if Rt >  0 (5.8)
where fi2 >  0 indexes the degree of convexity and the ‘price’ of investment is 
Mi+ Pit >  o.
R & D  costs The firm has the choice of building an R&D lab at a sunk cost 
of A+ <Px where cpff is an i.i.d. standard normal random variable. As discussed 
above we abstract away from the continuous R&D choice after building the R&D 
lab and assume that after building an R&D lab, R&D costs are a fixed proportion 
of firm sales (we also consider a model where R&D is simply a fixed cost paid 
every period after the lab is built). This is mainly for tractability so we do not
121
need to keep track of another continuous policy function. However, the empirical 
literature tends to find that R&D intensity (R&D to sales ratio) is highly serially 
correlated - indeed Klette and Kortum (2004) take this as a stylized fact that they 
try and fit with their model. We assume that the process that determines period 
to period R&D flows leads to R&D being proportional to sales. We report in Table 
5.11 in the Appendix some evidence that this does not seem to be a restrictive 
assumption. In future work we will try to make this an equilibrium outcome of 
our structural model.
Notice that under these assumptions productivity evolves stochastically de­
pending on whether the R&D sunk cost have been paid or not, i.e.
P(^i,t+1 1^ iti  Riti Xit) 
where p(.) is the conditional probability of u^t+i given u)it, Rit and Xu-
Financial C osts The assumption we will use is that firms face a financial 
cost increasing in the amount borrowed. We allow financial constraints to vary for 
firms who decide to start R&D. Following Gomes (2001) the specification is the 
following for the financial cost ( F C )  of external finance ( E X T )
F C ( E X T i t ) =  <
where
KRE X T it x 1 (EXTn >  0) if Ra+i — 1 and Rn — 0
(5.9)
K^RE X T it x l (E X T it >  0) otherwise
E X T it =  1  ^ ~ CFit
So the firm needs to borrow money to finance any amount invested above
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current cash flow (CFit) and the cost of external finance might vary from R&D 
to non-R&D firms. We implicitly impose two assumptions. First, firms exhaust 
all internal funds before borrowing (pecking order theory) and second, firms can 
only have two sources of funds internal or external.
Notice that we implicitly assume that the sunk costs of R&D are present in 
the company accounts as investment but we cannot identify them separately from 
other forms of investment. Also setting up an R&D lab could cause production 
disruption which would reduce profits and therefore cash flows. So the sunk costs 
of R&D are accounted by increasing the needs for external finance, E X T it.
E xit value Every period the firm has the option of exiting the industry and 
collect a scrap exit value of e +  (pft .
Period returns
Using the above specification the per period return function for an incumbent
is
iti K it) Rif> Xiti R it+ li  Xit+1? li ti  E X T # ,  S t)
—(A +  <Pit)(Rit+1 -  Rit)Rit+1 +  ( l  — Xu+i ) (e +  Pit)
Using the demand specified above (5.4) there are two ‘external’ variables that 
affect company’s revenues. One is market size (Y ) and the other is competitors’ 
adjusted price index (P). Since individual prices axe determined by productivity 
and physical capital, the price index is a mapping from individual firms’ pro­
ductivity and capital stock onto a pricing function so we get the aggregate state 
variable
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St =  Yt/P t (5.11)
It is important to recall that as explained before, firms adjust production to 
maximize short run profits through the only flexible input, labor.
5.5 T he estim ation  procedure
5.5.1 General approach
There axe currently several proposed alternatives to estimate dynamic industry 
models in the recent surge of estimation techniques which extend the work of Hotz 
and Miller (1993) for single agent models to dynamic games (see Pesendorfer and 
Schmidt-Dengler, forthcoming; Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2007; Bajaxi, Benkaxd 
and Levin, 2007; and Pakes, Ostxovsky and Bexxy, 2007). We follow closely the 
approach proposed by Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007) since this allows for both 
discrete and continuous choices and is easily applicable to the model outlined 
above. This framework has been applied by Ryan (2006) to study the impact of 
environmental regulation changes on capacity investment for the cement industry 
in the US. The industry state is the sum of competitors’ capacities rather than the 
individual capacities of competitors and this resembles the model we axe about to 
estimate. This is because players’ stxategies axe approximated by a function on 
individual and aggregate capacities, just like in the model developed in chapter 2.
The estimation proceeds in three steps. In the first step we recover the unob­
served productivity (ujit) via estimation of the production function. We consider 
a number of ways for estimating the production function (including Olley and 
Pakes, 1996; Ackerberg et al, 2008, and Bond and Soderbom, 2005), but we find 
these are broadly similar (see chapter 3). In the second step, we recover the profit
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function ( 7 r ( u K it, St) as well as the micro-level and industry-level state tran­
sitions, (p(ujit+i\ujiU Rit , Xu) and q(St+i\St))- We also estimate the equilibrium 
policy functions for investment, R&D and exit non-parametrically using a poly­
nomial expansion in the state variables. Finally, in the third step, we impose the 
equilibrium conditions to estimate the linear and quadratic investment cost para­
meters, R&D sunk costs, exit costs and financing costs i.e. the parameter vector 
(/ii,/i2,A,e,Kf,/Ci^).
By simulating actions and states from a starting configuration using the es­
timated policies and state transitions, and collecting these paths through time, 
we can calculate the present-value for a given path and a given set of parameters. 
Slightly perturbing the policy functions allows us to generate alternative paths and 
different present-values for a given parameter vector. The observed policy func­
tions were generated by profit-maximizing firms who chose the actions with the 
highest expected discounted value. This means that at the true parameters, the 
discounted value generated by the observed actions should be greater than those 
generated by any other set of actions. Particularly, at the true parameters, the 
perturbed actions should give a lower expected value and this is the equilibrium 
condition which identifies the structural parameters.
5.5.2 Identification
Adjustment costs for investment are identified off the observed investment 
behavior and profits earned. Using the estimated profits and state transition, we 
can recover an estimate of the marginal value of investment (or the continuation 
value). Once the marginal value is known, we can recover the marginal costs 
by choosing the adjustment cost parameters which are consistent with
observed investment being optimally chosen.
R&D sunk costs are identified from the observed R&D start-up decisions.
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Given the observed profits earned by R&D firms and non-R&D firms, we can 
recover the value of being an R&D firm and compare this with the R&D behav­
ior observed in the data. The sunk costs are the ones which rationalize observed 
behavior.
Financial costs are identified from the variation in investment at similar states 
when there are sufficient internal funds and when there are not sufficient funds. By 
comparing investment decisions when internal funds are available and when they 
are not available, we can therefore estimate the implied costs of external finance. 
Notice that due to the fact that identification arises from investment behavior like 
adjustment costs, there are potential problems for the separate identification of 
the two parameters. To see this note that equations (5.8) and (5.9) are potentially 
collinear:
F C (E X T it) +  C K (Iit, K it- i )  (5.12)
[(^i +  Pit)la +  ^ E X T it<  0
(fii +  (plt)Iit +  /J>2 Kit-'i (EXT#) if E X T n >  0, Ra+1=  1 and Rn— 0
(^i +  Vit)Iit +  +  Ki R(EXTit) otherwise
As seen above, if all investment is financially constrained, it becomes difficult 
to separately identify fix and k^ r (or kr ) because CFu and In are both functions 
of the same state variables and potentially multicollinear. Because of this we rely 
on two sources of identification: (i) the existence of variation between firms who 
are credit constrained (In > CFit) and firms who are not (Iit <  CFit) which 
allows us to back-out iix and fi2 from the first row of equation 5.12 and then 
recover kr ( k ^ )  in the second (third) row even with collinearity between the 
cash flow and investment variables; (ii) temporary cash flow shocks £it which 
affect the availability of internal funds but not the profitability of investment, can
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be used as an exclusion restriction that allows the identification of and Ki R. 
The unobserved payoff shocks, (pTit, are the structural error terms that allow us to 
"fit the data" and are assumed to enter additively as in Rust (1987).
5.5.3 Policy functions 
Investment
The investment function which results as the solution to [5.1] is
Iit 1 (  dE {V {sit^ S t^ \ s iu Su ait)) , , 1 \d F C (E X T it)]
K it-i ~  2 ^  \  flfc +  2 ^ [  dIit
(5.13)
which we estimate separately for R&D and non-R&D firms as:
In In =  Cko +  Cki In Kn—i +  Oi2 (I*1 Kit—i)2 d- In St d- o^^it T oi5 ln d- V-’it (5-14)
We can immediately see the typical problem of identification in reduced form 
models from equation 5.13. The same variables which determine the first term 
on the right hand side (marginal Q) are also the variables which determine the 
second term (the financial constraints function) and the two effects are difficult to 
separately identify.
We have also tried several specifications with different degrees for the polyno­
mials on the state variables. Notice the role of the temporary cash flow shock, ln f it 
(recovered from 5.7) which has no effect on the returns to investment 
but plays a role in relaxing the need for external funds dFC(^*Tit') and is therefore 
a relevant state variable for investment when firms need to raise external finance.
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R&D
Firms will decide to build an R&D lab if the expected future benefit of building 
(relative to not building) exceeds the sunk cost, i.e.
(A  +  <pS) <  P
E { V ( s i t + i ,  S t + i ) \ s i t ,  S t ,  I n ,  R it+ i — 1 }  
— E { V ( s i t + i ,  ' S ' t + i ) | s i t ,  S t ,  l a ,  R it+ i =  0 }  
So the probability that the firm starts performing R&D is:
Pr(Rit+i = l|Rit 0) i^t)
(
V it  <  - A  +  PPr
\
E{V(sit+ i, St+i)\Rit+i — 1} 
—E{V(sit+ \, St+i)\Rit+i = 0}
or
Pr(Rit+i — 1| R%t — 0) — $ —A + p
E{V(sit+ i, St+i)\Rit+i — 1} 
—E{V(sit+ i, St+i)\Rit+i = 0}
which we parametrize with a first order approximation:
Pr(Rit+i — 1|Rit — 0) — $  (oq +  ct\ \nK it- i  +  oli In +  a^un) (5.15)
where $  (.) is the cumulative normal density function.
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5.5.4 Minimum distance estimator
We use the Minimum Distance Estimator proposed by Bajari, Benkard and 
Levin (2007). Assuming the policy and transition functions are consistently esti­
mated, starting from a state configuration (so, So), we can draw vectors of payoff 
shocks ip =  (cp1, ipR, <ps ), simulate actions (ao) by reading off the policy functions 
and update states (si, Si) by reading off the transition functions. Doing this for 
long enough periods (each path has been simulated for T  periods), we compute a 
sequence of actions and states {a*(so, So, <£0), st(so> So), S*(so, So)}J=i from a start­
ing configuration (we have used na different starting configuration combinations 
for (so ,S o )) . With this sequence of actions and states, we can compute the dis­
counted stream of profits for a given parameter vector 9 and a given second step 
estimate for the policy and transition function (a), ^Jt=o Ptn (at> st, St , p t \ d, 9) 
which gives us an estimate of the expected value from a starting configuration 
E V (s0,So;a, 9) =  Y^=Qpt,K{a^ su ^ u P t \OL,9)}1 For each starting configuration 
we simulate n j  different path to get an average estimate
1 nj T
EV(s0,S0;a,6) =  — J 2 J 2  sj, Q,0)
In order for a strategy, cr, to be an equilibrium it must be that for all o' ^  a
F (5,S ;a ,g (S t+1|S*);0) >  V (s ,S ;a ',q (S t+1\Sty,e)
So the set of dynamic parameters 9, must rationalize the strategy profile cr. 
We just consider the case where 9 is point identified whereas Bajari et al. (2007) 
also develop the method for (bounds) set identification on 9.
Given the linearity of the value function on the dynamic parameters we can 
write
11 We set the discount factor at p =  0.88.
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V(s, S; <7, q(St+1 |5t); 9) =  W {s, S ; a, q(St+1 \St)) * 0
where W (st ,Su a, q(St+1\St)) =  Ea]st)St pswt and 6 =  [ l ,/^ ,/^ , A ,e ,/c f ,« ffl],
Wt ^ 7 r(s s , S 's ,  O’) ,  / s , 1 ,  0 ) ,  l ( X s + l  X s  - 0 ]  "
We construct alternative investment, R&D and exit policies (a') by drawing a 
mean-zero normal error and adding it to the estimated first stage policies. With 
these non-optimal policies we construct alternative expected values following the 
same procedure as before to get W(so,So’,cr',q(.)) (we calculate these values for 
na alternative policies).
We then compute the differences between the optimal and non-optimal value 
functions for several (Xk) policies and states k =  1, ...n/), where 72/ =  na * n3
g(x; 6, a) =  [# (« , S; o, q(St+1\St)) -  W(s, 5; o', g(5,+1|St))] * 0
Since the estimated policies should be optimal, the expected value when using 
a should be bigger then using alternative a'. The empirical minimum difference 
estimator minimizes the square of the empirical violations (g(x ,9 ,a)  <  0)
1 n/
J(6;a) =  —  V '  (min {g(Xk-6, a), 0})2
and
2 ni
6 =  argmin — (min {g(Xt ; 6, a ) , 0})2
660 n‘ t i
Notice that we set the length of each path T  =  100, the number of starting 
configurations ns — 350, the number of simulations for each configuration n j =  150 
and the number of alternative policies na =  500, so that we get the number of 
differences ni =  175,000
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5.6 D ata
We discuss the Data in more detail in the Data Appendix, but sketch the main 
details here. The data was collected from Standard and Poor’s COMPUSTAT 
dataset. We have selected all US firms in industry "Iron and Steel Mills", NAICS 
331111 for the period 1970-2005. We also get aggregate data from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) for total shipments, value added, and deflators (sales, 
materials and investment). Finally we get data from the US Geological Survey for 
total US production, shipments, imports, exports, price and total world produc­
tion. We drop observations with missing values for sales, value added, number of 
workers and investment. We interpolate some of these missing values when they 
were missing for only one intermediate year. We winsorize the data at 0.5% on 
each tail of the distribution for the variables cash flow, log of sales, log of capital 
stock, log of labor and log of TFP. From an initial sample of 1,263 observations we 
axe left with an unbalanced panel with 1,069 observations over the 25 year period. 
Only less then half of the firms report positive R&D expenditures. We set the 
discount factor p =  0.88.
The capital stock is generated using the perpetual inventory method and we 
use a 6% depreciation rate. We recover total factor productivity using a 
methodology similar to Levinsohn and Melitz (2004) and De Loecker (2007) to 
control for endogeneity as in Olley and Pakes (1996) but also incorporate imperfect 
competition in a similar way to Klette and Griliches (1996).
Our 25 years of data cover an average sample of 30 firms per year. Size dis­
tribution is skewed with the average firm being 3 times as large as the median 
firm. Investment rates over the whole period are around 15% per year with an 
average real sales growth of 2% per year and a decline in employment of 1% per 
year. R&D firms have however, reduced its labor force more heavily than their
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non-R&D counterparts. We also note that an R&D firm is on average more then 
three times as large.
As explained before, the industry is very reactive to the business cycle due 
to the fluctuations in demand for steel products. This can be seen in Table 5.2 
where yearly investment rates varied from a maximum of 25% in 1995 and 1996 
to a minimum of 4% in 2002. The same picture arises in the sales growth rates 
and cash flows. Total employment has been steadily decreasing with an increase 
in labor productivity which more then tripled in the 25 year period.
5.7 R esu lts
5.7.1 Preliminary evidence
We start with a brief analysis of the investment sensitivity to cash flows. For 
this we use a simple Error Correction Model (see Bond and Van Reenen, 2008 for 
a description of these reduced form approaches).
L- =  o l q C M - { +a%CMdyit + a2CMdyi t- i+afCM( k - y ) it-2 + a i CMyit-2
it i \  it—1
, „.e c m C F  ^e c m C F  „.e c m C F  , „ecm
+ a 6 ~~F7~ +<*7 -J T  + a 8 ~77~ +  EitK  it K  it-1  K  it—2
where is investment rate, dy  sales growth, (k — y) log of capital minus log 
of sales (error correction term), y log of sales and ^  cash flow to capital ratio.
The results in Table 5.3 show that cash flows have a very strong effect on 
investment and that this effect was stronger in the period pre 1994 in columns 
(iv) and (v). This suggests that credit constraints where stronger in the period 
before 1994, before the two waves of financial deregulation happened in the US 
(see Cunat and Guadalupe, 2005 for a discussion of the US financial deregulation
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V ariab le  (USD mio) O bs. M ean S td  dev. P (10) M edian P (90)
Sales 1,069 1,343 1,987 105 507 4,151
C a p ita l S tock 1,069 1,072 2,023 47 290 3,192
E m ployees (1 ,000’s) 1,069 11 24 1 3 35
R D /S a le s 1,069 0% 4% 0% 0% 1%
In v e s tm e n t/C a p ita l 1,002 15% 23% 2% 8% 31%
C ash  F lo w /C a p ita l 1,000 14% 27% -4% 13% 36%
R eal Sales g row th 1,002 2% 32% -20% 2% 23%
E m ploym en t G row th 1,002 -1% 17% -14% -1% 12%
L abor P ro d u c tiv ity 1,069 207 132 92 168 380
N o n -R D  f irm s
Sales 560 736 1,252 80 343 1,906
C a p ita l  S tock 560 516 1,189 29 156 1,355
E m ployees (1 ,000 ’s) 560 6 17 0 2 9
R D /S a le s 560 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
In v e s tm e n t/C a p ita l 506 17% 27% 2% 9% 38%
C ash  F lo w /C a p ita l 504 16% 32% -7% 13% 42%
R eal Sales grow th 506 5% 41% -21% 4% 26%
E m ploym en t G row th 506 1% 17% -13% 0% 15%
L abor P ro d u c tiv ity 560 238 152 108 188 444
R D  f irm s
Sales 509 2,011 2,393 195 979 5,251
C a p ita l  S tock 509 1,685 2,516 116 533 5,610
E m ployees (1 ,000 ’s) 509 18 29 2 6 48
R D /S a le s 509 1% 6% 0% 0% 2%
In v e s tm e n t/C a p ita l 496 12% 19% 2% 8% 21%
C ash  F lo w /C a p ita l 496 12% 21% -4% 12% 29%
R eal Sales grow th 496 0% 20% -19% 0% 16%
E m ploym en t G row th 496 -3% 17% -15% -2% 9%
L abor P ro d u c tiv ity 509 171 94 84 145 292
Table 5.1: Summary statistics for the Iron and Steel Mills Industry (NAICS 331111): 1970-2005.
year
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
O bs RD RD s ta r t  RD sales C a p ita l S tock  E m ployees R D /S a le s  In v es tm en t C ash  Flow R ea l Sales E m p lo y m en t L ab o r P ro d ,
(co u n t)  (coun t) (USD m io) (USD m io) (USD m io) (1 ,000’s) /C a p ita l  /C a p i ta l  g row th  g row th  (USD m io)
20 6 - 57 874 1375 31.7 0.6% 122
20 9 3 78 871 1425 28.7 0.6% 13% 27% 3% -3% 116
20 11 2 80 946 1441 27.9 0.9% 12% 28% 11% 1% 116
21 12 1 122 1141 1406 27.9 0.7% 18% 28% 20% 2% 131
22 13 1 123 1415 1411 27.2 0.5% 19% 37% 28% 1% 149
22 13 0 134 1295 1525 24.9 0.6% 18% 26% -6% -10% 127
22 14 1 179 1363 1608 24.2 0.6% 14% 17% 2% 1% 116
23 14 0 172 1427 1582 22.9 0.6% 10% 14% 8% 0% 114
23 14 0 174 1656 1635 23.8 0.5% 14% 18% 18% 5% 112
24 15 1 219 2111 1811 25.7 0.5% 16% 18% 18% 3% 117
25 15 0 245 2082 1792 23.4 0.5% 15% 15% 5% -3% 123
25 15 0 269 2322 1838 23.0 0.4% 28% 20% 13% 0% 136
24 14 0 165 1415 1402 13.8 0.5% 12% 4% -29% -26% 128
25 14 0 180 1364 1384 13.5 0.6% 6% 4% -12% -5% 113
25 13 0 196 1482 1289 13.4 0.6% 9% 7% 15% -3% 130
25 13 0 207 1198 1019 10.0 0.6% 9% 3% -3% -4% 124
28 12 0 172 1052 945 8.5 0.6% 7% 3% -10% -10% 143
35 13 1 183 949 781 7.1 0.6% 11% 13% 12% 5% 166
37 15 2 187 1109 755 6.8 5.8% 13% 25% 23% 1% 206
40 17 2 202 1157 - 780 6.7 4.2% 21% 17% 6% 0% 217
41 19 2 204 1083 790 6.1 4.6% 21% 5% -2% -3% 205
40 18 0 196 1020 822 5.8 0.5% 13% 4% -7% -5% 197
41 18 1 188 908 788 4.8 0.7% 8% -3% -2% -5% 234
42 17 0 165 975 776 4.7 0.9% 18% 13% 8% 4% 247
43 19 2 197 1111 785 4.7 1.0% 20% 23% 13% 1% 247
45 19 0 187 1143 774 4.5 0.9% 25% 30% 15% 5% 251
44 17 0 163 1178 802 4.6 0.4% 25% 20% 24% 2% 255
42 17 0 157 1277 856 4.7 0.4% 16% 16% 7% 1% 256
37 15 0 151 1368 985 5.0 0.4% 17% 12% -1% -2% 280
36 14 0 107 1253 968 4.8 0.4% 10% 3% -9% -2% 276
34 14 0 92 1430 1024 5.5 0.4% 9% 1% 7% 2% 290
28 13 0 78 1385 983 5.7 0.3% 5% -8% -10% -8% 298
27 13 0 71 1546 1013 5.7 0.3% 4% 3% 1% -2% 328
23 13 2 62 1808 823 6.3 0.3% 7% 1% 14% 3% 333
22 12 0 53 2893 857 6.6 0.2% 9% 30% 40% 3% 364
18 9 0 32 2960 892 6.7 0.2% 8% 24% 13% 4% 348
Table 5.2: Summary statistics for the Iron and Steel Mills Industry (NAICS 331111), totals per year.
D ep en d en t V ariab le: I /K
Coef.
(i)
All Y ears 
S.E. Pval Coef.
(" )
P re-1994
S.E. P val Coef.
(iii)
P ost-1994
S.E. Pval
I /K ( t -1 ) 0.19 0.07 0.00 0.29 0.09 0.00 0.11 0.07 0.13
dy(t) -0.05 0.03 0.10 -0.07 0.05 0.16 -0.03 0.04 0.51
d y ( t - i ) -0.03 0.03 0.38 -0.02 0.04 0.65 0.00 0.04 0.94
k -y (t-2 ) -0.01 0.01 0.26 -0.02 0.02 0.34 -0.01 0.01 0.47
y(t-2) 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.01 0.67 -0.01 0.00 0.28
C F /K ( t) 0.06 0.04 0.17 0.20 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.31
C F /K ( t - l ) 0.22 0.04 0.00 0.20 0.06 0.00 0.19 0.03 0.00
C F /K ( t-2 ) 0.08 0.05 0.07 -0.04 0.05 0.43 0.20 0.05 0.00
C o n s ta n t 0.07 0.04 0.12 0.06 0.04 0.12 0.07 0.03 0.06
O bse rva tions 864 513 351
G roups 59 46 46
A R (1) -3.87 0.00 -3.28 0.00 -3.45 0.00
A R (2) -2.59 0.01 -1.06 0.29 -1.76 0.08
C F  significance 0.36 0.05 0.00 0.36 0.06 0.00 0.43 0.08 0.00
(iv ) (v) (vi)
D ep en d en t V ariab le: I /K
Coef.
All years 
S.E . P val Coef.
All years 
S.E . P val Coef.
O LS/A I1 years 
S.E . P val
I /K  ( t - 1) 0.20 0.07 0.00 0.15 0.08 0.06 0.29 0.03 0.00
d y (t) -0.05 0.04 0.18 -0.01 0.04 0.88 0.01 0.02 0.68
d y ( t - l ) -0.02 0.03 0.66 0.02 0.03 0.63 0.05 0.02 0.02
k -y (t-2 ) -0.01 0.01 0.26 -0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.00
y (t-2 ) 0.00 0.00 0.53 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.11
C F /K ( t ) * l ( y e a r <  =  1994) 0.16 0.06 0.01 0.24 0.07 0.00 0.13 0.03 0.33
C F /K  ( t - l ) * l ( y e a r <  =  1994) 0.19 0.06 0.00 0.12 0.07 0.08 0.12 0.04 0.00
C F /K ( t-2 )* l( y e a r<  =  1994) 0.05 0.05 0.36 0.03 0.06 0.65 0.03 0.03 0.36
C F /K ( t ) * l ( y e a r >  1994) 0.01 0.04 0.75 0.05 0.04 0.23 -0.02 0.03 0.57
C F /K ( t - l ) * l ( y e a r >  1994) 0.24 0.06 0.00 0.17 0.07 0.01 0.24 0.04 0.00
C F /K  (t-2 )*  l(y e a r>  1994) 0.09 0.07 0.22 0.08 0.07 0.28 -0.05 0.03 0.13
C o n s ta n t 0.06 0.04 0.21 0.05 0.04 0.18 0.03 0.03 0.31
O bse rva tions 864 864 864
G roups 59 59 59
A R (1) -3.85 0.00 -3.50 0.00 .
A R (2) -2.29 0.02 -2.30 0.02 -
C F * l(y e a r<  =  1994) 0.40 0.06 0.00 0.39 0.08 0.00 0.28 0.03 0.00
C F * l(y e a r> 1 9 9 4 ) 0.34 0.07 0.00 0.29 0.06 0.00 0.18 0.04 0.00
N otes: T h e  re p o rte d  resu lts  are for th e  system  GMM  es tim a to r . In co lum ns (i)-(iv ) levels from perio d s  t-2  and 
t-3 have been  used  as in s tru m en ts  for th e  d ifference e q u a tio n s  and  d ifferences a t  t-2  and  t-3  as in s tru m e n ts  for th e  
levels eq u a tio n s . In co lum n (v) th e  lags used w here t-3  and t-4 . C olum n (v i) re p o rts  OLS re su lts . T im e dum m ies.
Table 5.3: ECM investment regressions: system GMM and OLS results.
waves).
Finally in Table 
random component 
above. The random
pre-1994. Notice that this component is the cash flow residual after controlling 
for size and productivity, so it should in principle have no effect on investment, 
unless firms are financially constrained.
We acknowledge that the dynamic panel data GMM methods’ asymptotic re­
sults are valid for large N,  and in our sample we have an unbalanced panel of 59 
firms over a period of 35 years. We have used alternative estimators with very
5.4 we split the cash flow into the predicted (CFf) and the 
(CFe), ln(£it) which is recovered by estimating equation 5.7 
cash flow component is significant and stronger in the period
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(i) ( i i) ( ii i)
D e p e n d e n t  V a r i a b l e :  I / K
All Y ears P re-1994  Post-1994
Coef. S .E . P val Coef. S .E . P val Coef. S.E . P val
I /K  ( t - l ) 0.23 0.06 0.00 0.23 0.09 0.01 0.20 0.09 0.02
d y (t) 0.04 0.04 0.35 0.03 0.05 0.55 0.06 0.04 0.15
d y ( t- l ) -0.02 0.05 0.74 -0.02 0.06 0.79 0.11 0.05 0.02
k -y (t-2 ) -0.01 0.02 0.71 -0.02 0.02 0.39 -0.06 0.03 0.03
y (t-2 ) 0.00 0.01 0.95 0.00 0.01 0.68 0.01 0.01 0.44
C F f /K ( t) -0.15 0.12 0.19 -0.10 0.17 0.56 -0.19 0.11 0.09
C F f/K  ( t - l ) 0.35 0.22 0.12 0.41 0.23 0.07 0.08 0.15 0.59
C F f/K  (t-2 ) 0.05 0.07 0.46 0.00 0.09 0.97 0.04 0.11 0.74
C F e /K (t) 0.68 0.67 0.31 1.03 1.45 0.48 0.50 0.59 0.40
C F e /K ( t- l ) 0.38 0.58 0.51 2.73 1.53 0.08 0.11 0.42 0.79
C F e /K (t-2 ) -0.27 0.23 0.24 -2.08 0.87 0.02 -0.02 0.18 0.91
C o n s tan t 0.09 0.07 0.24 0.10 0.05 0.03 -0.04 0.09 0.61
O bservations 597 370 227
G roups 54 40 42
A R (1) -3.85 0.00 -3.16 0.00 -2.44 0.01
A R (2) -2.23 0.03 -0.96 0.33 -1.89 0.06
C F f significance 0.25 0.12 0.04 0.30 0.15 0.04 -0.07 0.15 0.65
Cfe significance 0.78 0.64 0.22 1.67 0.97 0.08 0.59 0.59 0.32
N otes: In  co llum ns (i)-(iii)  levels from  p erio d s  t-2  and  t-3  have been used as in s tru m e n ts  for 
th e  difference e q u a tio n s  an d  d ifferences a t  t-2  an d  t-3  as in s tru m e n ts  for th e  levels eq u a tio n s . 
T im e dum m ies in c lu d ed . C F f and  CFe a re  p red ic ted  an d  th e  e rro r  co m p o n en t of th e  C F v ariab le
Table 5.4: ECM investment regression with cash flow shocks, before and after 
1994: system GMM results.
similar results. For example, in column (vi) of table 5.3 we report some results 
using a simple OLS estimator.
We now structurally estimate the model to recover the size of financial con­
straints consistent with observed behavior.
5.7.2 Step 1: Productivity (TFP) estim ates
In Table 5.5 we present production function estimates using alternative method­
ologies (OLS, Fixed Effects (FE), Olley and Pakes, 1996 (O&P), Ackerberg, Caves 
and Frazer, 2005 (ACF) and Bond and Soderbom, 2005 (B&S)). Since we do not 
have firm level price deflators, we account for imperfect competition and recover 
demand elasticity as proposed by Klette and Griliches (1996). We have used the 
same methodology as in chapter 3.
Our preferred specification in column (viii) controls for input endogeneity using 
the investment function inversion as proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996). We note 
that the labor and capital coefficients using either Fixed Effects or the dynamic
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(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) ( v i i i )  (ix) (x) (xi) (xii)
M ethodo logy  OLS F ixed  Effec ts Olley and  P akes B ond an d  S oderbom
L ab o r C oef 0.51 0.62 0.69 0.86 0.58 0.71 0.63 0 .6 5 0.61 0.69 0.79 0.78
C a p ita l C oef 0.34 0.29 0.36 0.13 0.33 -0.12 0.36 0 .4 3 0.74 0.37 0.28 0.29
P rice  C ost M argin -0.06 - 0.03 - - - 0.09 0 .1 8 0.46 - - -
R e tu rn s  to  scale 0.85 0.92 1.05 0.98 0.91 0.60 1.00 1 .0 7 1.35 1.06 1.08 1.06
T im e dum m ies No Yes No Yes No Yes No No No No No No
N otes (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
(a) Im p e rfe c t c o m p e titio n , in p u t dem an d  in d e p en d en t on ag g reg a te  shocks
(b) Im p e rfe c t c o m p e titio n , in p u t dem an d  d ep e n d en t on ag g reg a te  shocks
(c) Im p e rfe c t co m p e titio n , in p u t dem an d  d ep e n d en t on agg reg a te  shocks, m u ltico llin earity  co rrec tio n  (A ckerberg , Caves and  F razer)
(d) N on-R D  firm s
(e) RD firm s
Table 5.5: Production function estimates.
----------- tfp_rd -------------  tfp_nord
Figure 5.4: TFP distribution (CDF) for R&D and non-R&D firms
production function proposed by Bond and Soderbom are very similar. We find 
an estimate of demand elasticity for the Steel industry with implied "price-cost 
margins" of around 18%.
With these production function estimates we recover unobserved productivity. 
Figure 5.4 reports the productivity distribution, where R&D firms are on average 
3.5% more productive than non-R&D firms.
5.7.3 Step 2: Period returns, sta te  transitions and policy  
functions 
Period returns
Using the estimated productivity, u we can estimate the profit function using 
observed cash flows to substitute in equation 5.6. Our estimate for ln(£if) is 
used as the unanticipated and temporary cash flow shock which will, as discussed
above, bring in additional identification power to estimate the financial constraints 
parameters. As seen in equation 5.12, investment decisions when cash flows are 
not sufficient to cover investment might not be sufficient to separately identify 
adjustment and financial costs. The profit function results are reported in column
(i) of Table 5.6 and profits are increasing in productivity, capital stock and market 
size.
P olicy  functions
In this section we present the results for the estimated investment and R&D 
policy functions using equations 5.14 and 5.15.
Investm ent The results in Table 5.6 show that investment is increasing in all 
state variables. More interestingly, temporary cash flow shocks ln £it are positive 
and statistically significant and stronger for the R&D firms which is consistent 
with the previous literature on excess sensitivity to cash flows. Since these shocks 
increase internal funds available but should not affect future profitability of in­
vestment because they are constructed after removing the predictable part of cash 
flow, Oo +  Qi^it +  0 .2  In Ku +  ex.3 ln St, its significance can be taken as a first signal 
that financial costs are binding and therefore "FCq FFu  ^ i=- 0 .
R & D  Regarding R&D start-up decisions, from Table 5.6 we can see that 
larger and more productive firms are more likely to start performing R&D. Also, 
firms are more likely to start performing R&D when the state of the market (in 
terms of productivity and/or demand) is strong.
S ta te  transition
P rod u ctiv ity  As discussed above, productivity is recovered via production 
function estimation under the assumption that it follows a first order Markovian
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D ep en d en t V ariab le:
(i)
l n ( C F i t )  
Coef. S .E . P val.
(ii)
W i t )
N on-RD  firm s 
Coef. S .E . P val. Coef.
(iii)
RD  firm s 
S .E . P val. Coef.
(iv)
I n ( R D i t )
S .E . P val.
0.65 0.02 0.00 0.78 0.13 0.00 -0.01 0.31 0.98 0.10 0.11 0.36
- - 0.00 0.01 0.77 0.06 0.02 0.01 - - -
ln ( S t ) 0.61 0.09 0.00 -0.05 0.13 0.68 0.21 0.11 0.07 0.88 0.36 0.01
w it 1.15 0.15 0.00 1.06 0.29 0.00 0.51 0.28 0.07 0.25 0.66 0.70
t i t - - 0.36 0.05 0.00 0.42 0.04 0.00 - - -
C o n s ta n t -10.60 1.40 0.00 -1.60 2.09 0.45 -2.39 1.90 0.21 -15.92 5.36 0.00
R 2 0.69 0.73 0.73 0.09
O bse rv a tio n s 836 433 403 520
N otes: E s tim a te s  for th e p ro fit function  (i), in v estm en t policy  fu nc tions  for RD and  non-R D  firm s (ii) an d  (iii) and  RD s ta r t -u p  p ro b it (iv ).
Table 5.6: Profit function and policy function for investment and RD, OLS estimates.
D e p .  V a r i a b l e
N on-RD  firm s RD firm s
Coef. S .E . P v a l. Coef. S .E . P v a l.
[“' t - l ] 1.13 0.41 0.01 0.69 0.15 0.00
[‘‘’t - l ] 2 -0.13 0.32 0.67 0.42 0.15 0.01
[“ t - l ] 3 0.02 0.08 0.83 -0.16 0.05 0.00
c o n s ta n t 0.03 0.18 0.86 0.06 0.05 0.25
S .E .(res id u a ls ) 0.13 0.12
R 2 0.73 0.87
O bse rva tions 467 469
Long  ru n  d is tr ib u tio n
E {  u ) 1.36 1.39
s td (u i) 0.26 0.46
D a ta  m om en ts
E (  u,) 1.37 1.41
s td (b j) 0.25 0.34
N ote: R esu lts  for th e  p ro d u c tiv ity  tra n s i t io n  using  a 3 rd  degree p o lynom ia l.
Table 5.7: Transition function for productivity, OLS results.
process
U it+ i — E(cuit+ i\Lji t , R it) +  Vn
which we estimate using a third order polynomial separately for R&D and 
non-R&D firms
Wit+i =  Vo +  Vi Wit +  +  "it
With these estimated coefficients we can generate the steady-state distribution 
for R&D and non-R&D firms implied by these coefficients and compare them with 
the productivity distribution in the data. The estimated coefficients presented in 
Table 5.7 imply a steady state distribution for productivity which is 3% larger for 
R&D performing firms. Comparing with the actual moments for productivity in 
the data, the implied long run distribution for productivity matches closely actual 
productivity distribution.
A ggregate sta te  One of the main results of the framework proposed in chap­
ter 2  is that one can use the aggregate state to represent the industry evolution. 
Under some assumptions, the resulting equilibrium evolution for the aggregate
state is Markovian. In this section we test whether this is a valid model. This 
is important to confirm (or reject) the model’s assumption that allow the use of 
the aggregate state. We do this by checking in Table 5.8 the significance of previ­
ous lags of the state variable (which would constitute a violation of a first order 
Markovian process) and we do not reject the null hypothesis that the assumption is 
valid. We further investigate this by testing whether further moments of the state 
variables (cu, K )  are statistically significant conditional on St~ i- Particularly, the 
first and second moments of the productivity and capital stock distribution are 
not statistically significant, conditional on St~\,which again confirms our previous 
result.
5.7.4 Step 3: Main results
In step 3 we use the minimum distance estimator outlined above to recover the 
linear and quadratic investment cost (/q,/z2), R&D sunk cost (A), exit value (e) 
and costs of external finance ( « f , k>i R)- Given the estimated period returns, pol­
icy functions, and state transitions we can simulate industry paths, which allows 
to recover an estimate of the value function conditional on the dynamic parame­
ters (V^(/il7 /i2, A, e, kr , k>i R)). By slightly perturbing the estimated policies (for 
investment, R&D and exit) we can obtain an estimate of the value function for 
these alternative policies (V ^ /q ,/^ , A, e, kr , k,i R)). The estimator then searches 
for the parameters, (yLi2, /x2, A, e, k>i R), which rationalize the observed actions 
as being optimal.
For the R&D firms we have assumed that firms incur a fixed cost every period, 
equivalent to 1% of total sales in order to keep the R&D lab running. The value 
of 1% is the average R&D to sales ratio observed in the data for R&D firms. 
Standard errors were estimated using the bootstrap.
The results in Table 5.9 reveal that adjustment costs for investment are increas-
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D ep. V ariab le
Coef.
(0
S .E . P val. Coef.
(»)
S.E . P val. Coef.
(iii)
S .E . P val. Coef.
(iv)
I n ( S t )
S .E . P val. Coef.
(v)
S.E . P val. Coef.
(vi)
S .E . P val. Coef.
(vii)
S .E . P val.
I n ( S t - i ) 0.92 0.07 0.00 3.34 6.98 0.64 0.89 0.18 0.00 0.94 0.09 0.00 - - - - - - 0.93 0.12 0.00
J n (S t _ j ) a - - - -0.08 0.24 0.73 - . - - . . . - - - - - - - -
l n ( S t _ 2 ) - - - - - - 0.03 0.18 0.87 - - - - - - - - - - - -
E ( l n ( K i t )) - - - - - - - - - - - - - -0.09 0.13 0.51 0.11 0.08 0.17
E i l n C K u - ! ) ) - - - - - - - - - 0.13 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.14 0.99 - - - - - -
s td (In (JC i t ) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -0.84 0.30 0.01 0.06 0.19 0.76
s t d ( f n ( / f i t _ i ) - - - - - - - - - -0.01 0.17 0.98 -0.73 0.32 0.03 - - - - - -
E(u>it ) - - - - - - - - - - . - - - - -0.20 0.11 0.09 0.00 0.07 0.99
E f a i t - i ) - - - - - - - - - 0.09 0.06 0.13 -0.10 0.12 0.38 - - - - - -
s td ( :o jt ) - - - - - - - - - - - . . - - -0.54 0.18 0.01 -0.04 0.13 0.74
s t d ^ t . , ) - - - - - - - - - 0.01 0.10 0.92 -0.47 0.19 0.02 - - - - - -
C o n s ta n t 1.22 1.10 0.28 -16.69 51.62 0.75 1.16 1.20 0.34 1.35 1.61 0.41 15.44 1.71 0.00 15.10 1.63 0.00 0.42 1.88 0.83
R 2
O b se rv a tio n s
0.82
35
0.82
35
0.81
34
0.85
35
0.34
35
0.40
35
- 0.83
35
N otes: E s tim a te s  for th e  ag g reg a te  s ta te  law of m o tion . C o lum ns (i) and  (ii) using  a linear and  q u a d ra tic  ap p ro x im atio n . C o lum n (iii) te s ts  th e  f irs t o rd e r raarkov  a ssu m p tio n . 
C o lum ns (iv )-(v ii) fu r th e r  te s t  th e  significance o f m om en ts for p ro d u c tiv ity  and  c a p ita l .
Table 5.8: Aggregate state transition and tests, OLS results.
In v es tm en t C ost RD cost E x it V alue F in an c ia l C ost
M l________ M2__________ b.____________ e k ? r  nf*______kq______K2_____ k 3
Coefficients -0.19 3.09 194 -588 0.37
l
1.20 -------- -—
•'-z "•
Standard Errors 0.18 1.09 62 63 0.48 0.64 - -
Coeffi cien ts -0.16 3.07 194 -597 . 0.35 .
Standard Errors 0.17 1.06 61 63 . 0.46 .
C oefficients -0.14 3.64 182 -560 - -0.80 0.01
Standard Errors 0.16 1.02 65 64 - 0.39 0.01
Coeffi cien ts -0.26 4.65 169 -632 . -22.5 0.36 .
Standard Errors 0.17 1.18 62 71 . 8.4 0.56 .
Coeffi cien ts -0.21 4.38 173 -590 - -12.6 -0.45 0.01
Standard Errors 0.16 1.10 58 65 - 7.3 0.40 0.01
N otes: D ynam ic p a ra m e te r  coefficient e s tim a te s . B o o ts tra p p e d  s ta n d a rd  e rro rs
Table 5.9: Investment cost, RD sunk cost, exit value and financial costs.
ing in the amount invested. The R&D sunk costs are estimated at $194 million 
dollars (in 1987 USD) which represents around 10% of average annual sales and 
70% of average annual profits.
Finally our main parameter of interest, the costs of external finance, are signifi­
cant since for each dollar raised in external finance, there is an estimated additional 
financial cost of 37 cents for non-R&D firms and 1.20 dollars for firms who start 
R&D. This reflects substantial external financial costs, particularly for firms who 
want to start R&D suggesting that some firms might be prevented from starting 
R&D if they do not have sufficient internal funds.
5.8 R obustness o f th e  resu lts
5.8.1 Fixed and quadratic costs of finance
Because of the identification reasons outlined above we have adopted the sim­
plest specification but we have also estimated more flexible parametrization for 
financing costs introducing both a fixed and a quadratic component in the follow­
ing way
F C (E X T it) =  [/to +  k2E X T u +  k3EXT%} * 1 (E X TU >  0)
The overall results emerging from Table 5.9 are that the costs of external 
finance are increasing in the total amount borrowed.
5.8.2 Pre and post 1994
Our error correction model results suggested higher financial constraints in 
the period before 1994 due to deregulation in the financial sector. We investigate 
this by estimating the model separately for the two sub-periods. The results in
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P r e  1 0 9 4 In v es tm en t C ost RD cost E x it Value F in an c ia l C ost
Mi M2 A e
N fl*1 K, *0 *2 k 3
C oefficients -0.32 3.52 149 -638 0.34 0.72
Standard  Errors 0.18 1.05 84 U 0.72 0.65
Coefficients -0.34 3.72 168 -639 0.46
Standard Errors 0.18 1.09 89 74 0.69
C oefficients -0.30 4.16 143 -596 -0.75 0.01
Standard Errors 0.19 1.35 82 80 0.95 0.00
C oefficients -0.41 5.03 154 -665 -25.0 0.33
Standard Errors 0.19 1.53 85 74 13.9 0.73
C oefficients -0.31 4.38 141 -603 -4.4 -0.70 0.01
Standard Errors 0.24 1.76 95 77 11.1 0.98 0.00
P o s  19 9 4 In v es tm en t C ost RD cost E x it V alue F in an c ia l C ost
Mi M2 A e „ N R* i * i *0 *2 «3
C oefficients -0.07 3.65 138 • 501 -0.60 -0.57
Standard Errors 0.20 1.39 58 71 0.62 0.61
C oefficients -0.17 4.48 193 -486 -0.65
Standard Errors 0.20 1.10 49 69 0.18
C oefficients -0.10 5.07 177 -450 -1.30 0.00
Standard Errors 0.18 1.11 105 77 0.23 0.00
C oefficients -0.19 6.19 177 -512 -29.6 -1.07
Standard Errors 0.16 1.27 52 67 11.8 0.17
C oefficients -0.07 5.31 120 -486 -18.8 -1.29 0.00
Standard Errors 0.16 1.35 131 108 17.1 0.24 0.00
N otes: D ynam ic  p a ra m e te r  coefficient e s tim a te s . B o o ts tra p p e d  s ta n d a rd  e rro rs
Table 5.10: Investment cost, RD sunk cost, exit value and financial costs: sample split before and after 1994.
Table 5.10 confirm the previous evidence with the costs of external finance being 
substantially higher in the period before 1994.
5.9 F inal com m ents
In this chapter we have presented a dynamic structural model of investment 
and R&D where there are financial frictions (external finance is more costly than 
internal finance). We have fitted the parameters of this model to 35 years of firm- 
level data from the US iron and steel industry. We find that there is evidence of 
financial constraints as external financing is much costlier than internal financing 
with a premium of 35 cents to the dollar. Furthermore, we estimate there are 
substantial sunk costs for R&D - on the order of $194m.
Given the difficulties in credibly identifying the effects of financing constraints 
we believe that our structural approach offers a promising way forward in investi­
gating their importance. As in any structural model, we have had to make several 
assumptions and although we have tried to test many of them, there is surely 
much more robustness testing to be done.
In terms of future work there are several avenues. First, we have abstracted 
away from ongoing R&D costs and focused on the discrete decision over whether or 
not to build an R&D lab. This makes the analysis more tractable, but is clearly 
unsatisfactory. Second, it would be good to have some more "external instru­
ments" for cash flow, such as using the fact that firms are often multidivisional 
and a cash flow shock in one division should affect investment in unrelated divi­
sions if there are financing constraints. These quasi-experimental treatment effects 
could be combined with the structural model to generate better identification of 
the costs of external financing. Thirdly, we have not used the structure of external 
financing - debt vs. equity for example, to further pin down the model. Finally,
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we would like to investigate the adequacy of the model in a wider range of sectors. 
This work is all in progress.
5.A  A ppendix
5.A.1 Data and sample construction
The data was collected from Standard and Poor’s COMPUSTAT dataset. We 
have selected all US firms in industry "Iron and Steel Mills", NAICS 331111 
for the period 1970-2005. We use aggregate data from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) for total shipments, value added and deflators (sales, materials 
and investment). Finally we get data from the US Geological Survey for total US 
production, shipments, imports, exports, price and total world production. We 
drop observations with missing values for sales, number of workers and Investment. 
We interpolate some of these missing values when they were missing for only 
one intermediate year. We winsorize the data at the 0.5% on each tail of the 
distribution for the variables cash flow, log of sales, log of materials, log of capital 
stock, log of labor and log of TFP. From a initial sample of 1,263 observations we 
are left with an unbalanced panel with 1,069 observations over the 25 year period. 
Our sample covers around 88% of total industry sales varying from a minimum of 
73% in 1972 to a maximum of 103% in 1980.
The capital stock is generated using the perpetual inventory method and we 
use a 6% depreciation rate. We use the following variables (all in US $millions 
unless otherwise stated).
V  Ait - Value Added
CFn - Cash Flow
K it - Capital Stock
Lit - Number of Workers (’000)
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OLS F ixed  Effects
D ep. V ariab le  R D u / S a l e s a
Coef. s.e. P val C oef. s.e. P val
R J D i l_ l /S a I e s i t _ i 0.96 0.01 0.00 0.136 0.035 0.00
C o n s tan t 0.00 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00
R 2 0.95 0.95
N otes: E v idence o f c o n s ta n t firm level RD to  sales ra tio .
Table 5.11: RD to sales ratio, AR1.
Yit - Sales
St - Total US Shipments (metric tons)
IM P t - Total US Imports (metric tons)
E X t - Total US Exports (metric tons)
Yt - Total US Production (metric tons)
W Pt - Total World Production (USD billion)
5t - Physical Capital deflator 
P f  - Sales deflator (USD per ton)
P / - Investment deflator (1987=100)
RDit - Research and Development expenditures
We recover total factor productivity (u;if) using a methodology similar to Levin- 
sohn and Melitz (2004) and De Loecker (2007) to control for endogeneity as in 
Olley and Pakes (1996) but also incorporate imperfect competition in a similar 
way to Klette and Griliches (1996).
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